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Abstract
We study repeated independent Blackwell experiments; standard examples include
drawing multiple samples from a population, or performing a measurement in different
locations. In the baseline setting of a binary state of nature, we compare experiments in
terms of their informativeness in large samples. Addressing a question due to Blackwell
(1951) we show that generically, an experiment is more informative than another in
large samples if and only if it has higher Rényi divergences. As an application of
our techniques we in addition provide a novel characterization of kth-order stochastic
dominance as second-order stochastic dominance of large i.i.d. sums.
1 Introduction
Statistical experiments form a general framework for modeling information: Given a set
Θ of parameters, an experiment (or information structure) P produces an observation
distributed according to Pθ, given the true parameter value θ ∈ Θ. Blackwell’s celebrated
theorem (Blackwell, 1951) provides a partial order for comparing experiments in terms of
their informativeness.
As is well known, requiring two experiments to be ranked in the Blackwell order is a
demanding condition. Consider the problem of testing a binary hypothesis θ ∈ {0, 1}, based
on random samples drawn from one of two experiments P or Q. According to Blackwell’s
ordering, P is more informative than Q if, for every test performed based on observations
produced by Q, there exists another test based on P that has lower probabilities of both
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Type-I and Type-II errors (Blackwell and Girshick, 1979). This is a difficult condition to
satisfy, especially in the case where only one sample is produced by each experiment.
In many applications, an experiment does not consist of a single observation but of
multiple i.i.d. samples. We study a weakening of the Blackwell order that is appropriate
for comparing experiments in terms of their large sample properties. Our starting point is
the question, first posed by Blackwell (1951), of whether it is possible for n independent
observations from an experiment P to be more informative than n observations from
another experiment Q, even though P and Q are not comparable in the Blackwell order.
The question was answered in the affirmative by Torgersen (1970) and Azrieli (2014).
However, identifying the precise conditions under which this phenomenon occurs has
remained an open problem.
We say that P dominates Q in large samples if for every n large enough, n independent
observations from P are more informative, in the Blackwell order, than n independent
observations from Q. We focus on a binary set of parameters Θ, and show that generically
P dominates Q in large samples if and only if the first is more informative in terms of
Rényi divergences (Theorem 1). Rényi divergences are a one-parameter family of measures
of informativeness for experiments; introduced and characterized axiomatically in Rényi
(1961), we show that they capture the asymptotic informativeness of an experiment.
The result crucially relies on two ingredients. First, the proof uses techniques from
large deviations theory to compare sums of i.i.d. random variables in terms of stochastic
dominance. In addition, we provide and apply a new characterization of the Blackwell
order: We associate to each experiment a new statistic, the perfected log-likelihood ratio,
and show that the comparison of these statistics in terms of first-order stochastic dominance
is in fact equivalent to the Blackwell order.
By applying the methods we employed to study experiments, in the second part of the
paper we establish new laws of large numbers for comparing sums of i.i.d. random variables
in terms of stochastic dominance. We say that a random variable X kth-order dominates
a random variables Y in large numbers if for large n, the sum X1 + · · · + Xn of n i.i.d.
copies of X dominates the sum of n i.i.d. copies of Y with respect to k-th order stochastic
dominance. Stochastic dominance in large numbers is implied by, but strictly weaker than,
stochastic dominance between X and Y . We focus on stochastic dominance for its many
applications, both in economics and in other fields, as well as for its conceptual simplicity.
In the same way the classic law of large numbers provides non-parametric predictions
about long-run frequencies, stochastic dominance provides unambiguous choice predictions
that are independent of the decision maker’s preferences. Dominance in large numbers is a
likewise natural criterion for comparing prospects that involve repeated independent risks,
such as the return of a long-term investment.
We show that stochastic dominance in large numbers admits a simple characterization
in terms of the unanimous rankings of CARA preferences. Theorem 3 shows that all CARA
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agents rank a gamble X above a gamble Y if and only if X first-order dominates Y in
large numbers. Second-order dominance is characterized by the unanimous rankings of
risk-averse and the opposite rankings of risk-loving CARA preferences (Theorems 4 and 5).
These results shed new light on a classic question, raised first by Samuelson (1963), on the
relation between preferences over one-shot gambles and preferences over repeated gambles.
Finally, we provide a novel characterization of higher order stochastic dominance,
showing that dominance in the kth order for some k ≥ 2 is equivalent to second-order
stochastic dominance in large numbers, which in turn is equivalent to kth-order dominance
in large numbers for every k ≥ 2. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, higher-order attitudes over
risk (e.g., prudence, temperance, etc.) reduce to simple risk aversion when considering i.i.d.
sums of gambles.
The paper is organized as follows. In §2 we provide our main definitions. Section §3
contains the characterization of Blackwell dominance in large samples, while §4 presents a
proof sketch. In §5 we study stochastic dominance in large numbers. Finally, we further
discuss our results and their relation to the literature in §6.
2 Model
2.1 Statistical Experiments
A state of the world θ can take two possible values, 0 or 1. A Blackwell-Le Cam experiment
P = (Ω, P0, P1) consists of a sample space Ω and a pair of probability measures (P0, P1)
defined on a σ-algebraA of subsets of Ω, with the interpretation that Pθ(A) is the probability
of observing A ∈ A in state θ ∈ {0, 1}. To ease the exposition we will suppress the σ-algebra
A from the notation. This framework is commonly encountered in simple hypothesis tests
as well as in information economics. In §6 we discuss the case of experiments for more
than two states.
We restrict attention to experiments where the measures P0 and P1 are mutually
absolutely continuous, so that no signal realization ω ∈ Ω perfectly reveals either state.
Given two experiments P = (Ω, P0, P1) and Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1), we can form the product
experiment P ⊗Q given by
P ⊗Q = (Ω× Ξ, P0 ×Q0, P1 ×Q1).
where Pθ × Qθ, given θ ∈ {0, 1}, denotes the product of the two measures. Under the
experiment P ⊗ Q the realizations produced by P and Q are observed, and the two
observations are independent conditional on the state. For instance, if P and Q consist of
drawing samples from two different populations, then P ⊗Q consists of the joint experiment
where a sample from each population is drawn. We denote by
P⊗n = P ⊗ · · · ⊗ P
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the n-fold product experiment where n independent observations are generated according
to the experiment P .
Consider now a Bayesian decision maker whose prior belief assigns probability 1/2
to the state being 1. Fixing a uniform prior simplifies the discussion and is without loss
of generality.1 To each experiment P = (Ω, P0, P1) we can associate a Borel probability
measure pi over [0, 1] that represents the distribution over posterior beliefs induced by
the experiment. Formally, let p(ω) be the posterior belief that the state is 1 given the
realization ω:
p(ω) = `(ω)1 + `(ω) where `(ω) =
dP1
dP0
(ω).
and define, for every Borel set B ⊆ [0, 1]
piθ(B) = Pθ ({ω : p(ω) ∈ B})
as the probability that the posterior belief will belong to B, given state θ. We then define
pi = (pi0 + pi1)/2 as the unconditional measure over posterior beliefs. We say that P is
trivial if P0 = P1, and bounded if the support of pi includes neither 0 nor 1. Equivalently, in
a bounded experiment the posterior belief p is bounded away from 0 and 1; in particular,
no observation completely reveals the state.
2.2 The Blackwell Order
We first review the main concepts behind Blackwell’s order over experiments (Bohnenblust,
Shapley, and Sherman, 1949; Blackwell, 1953). Consider two experiments P and Q and
their induced distribution over posterior beliefs denoted by pi and τ , respectively. The
experiment P Blackwell dominates Q, denoted P  Q, if∫ 1
0
v(p) dpi(p) ≥
∫ 1
0
v(p) dτ(p) (1)
for every continuous convex function v : (0, 1)→ R. We write P  Q if P  Q and Q 6 P .
So, P  Q if and only if (1) holds with a strict inequality whenever v is strictly convex.
As is well known, each convex function v can be seen as the indirect utility, or value
function, induced by some decision problem. That is, for each convex v there exists a set
of actions A and a utility function u defined on A× {0, 1} such that v(p) is the maximal
expected utility that a decision maker can obtain in such a decision problem given a belief
p. Hence, P  Q if and only if in any decision problem, an agent can obtain a higher
payoff by basing her action on the experiment P rather than on Q.
Blackwell’s theorem shows that the order  can be equivalently defined by “garbling”
operations: Intuitively, P  Q if and only if the outcome of the experiment Q can be
1See Section 4 in Blackwell (1953).
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generated from the experiment P by compounding the latter with additional noise, without
adding further information about the state.2
As discussed in the introduction, we are interested in understanding the large sample
properties of the Blackwell order. This motivates the next definition.
Definition 1. An experiment P dominates an experiment Q in large samples if there
exists an N ∈ N such that
P⊗n  Q⊗n for every n ≥ N. (2)
This order was first defined by Azrieli (2014) under the terminology of eventual
sufficiency. The definition captures the informal notion that a large sample drawn from P
is more informative than an equally large sample drawn from Q. Consider, for instance,
the case of hypothesis testing. The experiment P dominates Q in the Blackwell order
if and only if for every test based on Q there exists a test based on P that has weakly
lower probabilities of both Type-I and Type-II errors. Definition 1 extends this notion to
large samples, in line with the standard paradigm of asymptotic statistics: P dominates
Q if every test based on n conditionally i.i.d. realizations of Q is dominated by another
test based on n conditionally i.i.d. realizations of P for sufficiently large n. As shown by
Blackwell (1951, Theorem 12), dominance of P over Q implies dominance of P⊗n over
Q⊗n, for every n. So dominance in large samples is a refinement of the Blackwell order.3
This refinement is strict, as shown by examples in Torgersen (1970) and Azrieli (2014).
A natural alternative definition would require P⊗n  Q⊗n to hold for some n, but as
we show below the resulting order is equivalent under a mild genericity assumption.
2.3 Rényi Divergence and the Rényi Order
Our main result relates Blackwell dominance in large samples to a well-known notion
of informativeness due to Rényi (1961). Given an experiment (Ω, P0, P1), a state θ, and
parameter t > 0, the Rényi t-divergence is defined as
RθP (t) =
1
t− 1 log
∫ (dPθ
dP1−θ
(ω)
)t−1
dPθ (3)
when t 6= 1, and, to ensure continuity,
RθP (1) =
∫
Ω
log dPθdP1−θ
(ω) dPθ(ω).
2Formally, given two experiments P = (Ω, P0, P1) and Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1), P  Q iff there is a measurable
kernel (also known as “garbling”) σ : Ω → ∆(Ξ), where ∆(Ξ) is the set of probability measures over Ξ,
such that for every θ and every measurable A ⊆ Ξ, Qθ(A) =
∫
σ(ω)(A)dPθ(ω). In other terms, there is a
(perhaps randomly chosen) measurable map f with the property that for both θ = 0 and θ = 1, if X is a
random quantity distributed according to Pθ then Y = f(X) is distributed according to Qθ.
3For two partial orders σ and τ on a domain X, we say that σ is a refinement of τ , if x τ y
implies x σ y for all x, y ∈ X.
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Equivalently, RθP (1) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the measures Pθ and P1−θ.
Intuitively, observing a sample realization for which the likelihood-ratio (dPθ/dP1−θ)(ω)
is high constitutes evidence that favors state θ over 1− θ. For instance, in case t = 2, a
higher value of RθP (2) describes an experiment that, in expectation, more strongly produces
evidence in favor of the state θ when this is the correct state. Varying the parameter t allows
to consider different moments for the distribution of likelihood ratios. The Rényi divergence
has found applications to statistics and information theory (Liese and Vajda, 2006; Csiszár,
2008), machine learning (Póczos et al., 2012; Krishnamurthy et al., 2014), computer science
Fritz (2017), and quantum information (Horodecki et al., 2009; Jensen, 2019). Another
well known measure of informativeness is the Hellinger transform (Torgersen, 1991, p. 39),
which amounts to a monotone transformation of the Rényi divergences of an experiment.
Rényi Order. We say that an experiment P dominates an experiment Q in the Rényi
order if it holds that
RθP (t) > RθQ(t)
for all θ ∈ {0, 1} and all t > 0. The Rényi order is a refinement of the (strict) Blackwell
order. In the proof of Theorem 1 below, we explicitly construct a one-parameter family of
decision problems with the property that dominance in the Rényi order is equivalent to
higher expected utility with respect to each decision problem in this family.
A simple calculation shows that if P = Q⊗ T is the product of two experiments, then
for every state θ,
RθP = RθQ +RθT .
A key implication is that P dominates Q in the Rényi order if and only if the same
relation holds for their n-th fold repetitions P⊗n and Q⊗n, for any n. Hence, the Rényi
order compares experiments in terms of properties that are unaffected by the number of
repetitions. Because, in turn, the Rényi order refines the Blackwell order, it follows that
domination in the Rényi order is a necessary condition for domination in large samples.
3 Characterization
We call two bounded experiments P and Q generic if the essential maxima of the log-
likelihood ratios log dP1dP0 and log
dQ1
dQ0 are different, and if their essential minima are also
different.
Theorem 1. For a generic pair of bounded experiments P and Q, the following are
equivalent:
(i). P dominates Q in large samples.
(ii). P dominates Q in the Rényi order.
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It seems difficult to obtain an applicable characterization of large sample dominance
without imposing any genericity conditions. In §K in the appendix we discuss the knife-edge
case where the maxima or the minima of the supports might be equal, and show that the
conclusions of Theorem 1 no longer hold.
3.1 Examples
In this section we illustrate Theorem 1 by means of two examples of pairs of experiments
that are not Blackwell ranked, but are ranked in large samples.
Example 1. We first introduce a new example of two such experiments P and Q. The
first experiment P appears in Smith and Sørensen (2000). The signal space is the interval
[0, 1], and the conditional measures P0 and P1 are absolutely continuous with densities
f0(s) = 1 and f1(s) = 1/2 + s. Our second experiment Q is binary, with signal space
{0, 1}. The conditional measure Q0 assigns probability 1/2 to both signals, while the other
conditional measure is Q1(1) = p and Q1(0) = 1− p.
For p = 0.625, P Blackwell dominates Q, as witnessed by the garbling from [0, 1] to
{0, 1} that maps all signal realizations above 1/2 to 1 and all realizations below 1/2 to
0. For larger p, P is no longer Blackwell dominant. To see this, consider the decision
problem in which the prior belief is uniform, the set of actions is the set of states, and the
utility is one if the action matches the state and zero otherwise. It is easy to check that
for p > 0.625, the experiment Q yields a larger expected utility in this decision problem.
Nevertheless, if we choose p = 0.63, then as Figure 1 below suggests, P dominates Q in
the Rényi order even though the two experiments are not Blackwell ranked.4 Thus, by
Theorem 1, there is some n so that n independent samples from P Blackwell dominate n
independent samples from Q.
We end this section with a proposition that generalizes the example above, showing
that a binary experiment Q with the same properties can be constructed for (almost) any
experiment P .
Proposition 1. Let P be a bounded experiment with induced distribution over posteriors pi.
Assume that the support of pi has cardinality at least 3. Then there is a binary experiment
Q such that P and Q are not Blackwell ranked, and P dominates Q in large samples.
4The Rényi divergences as defined in (3) are computed to be
R0P (t) =
1
t− 1 log
(
(3/2)2−t − (1/2)2−t
2− t
)
; R1P (t) =
1
t− 1 log
(
(3/2)t+1 − (1/2)t+1
t+ 1
)
and
R0Q(t) =
1
t− 1 log
(
2−t · (p1−t + (1− p)1−t)
)
; R1Q(t) =
1
t− 1 log
(
2t−1 · (pt + (1− p)t)
)
.
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Figure 1: The Rényi divergences R0P (blue), and R0Q (orange) for p = 0.63 in Example 1.
The comparison between R1P and R1Q yields a similar graph.
The proof of this proposition crucially relies on Theorem 1.
Example 2 and a conjecture by Azrieli (2014). We next apply Theorem 1 to revisit
an example due to Azrieli (2014) and to complete his analysis. The example provides a
simple instance of two experiments that are not ranked in Blackwell order but become so
in large samples. Despite its simplicity, the analysis of this example is not straightforward,
as shown by Azrieli (2014). We will show that applying the Rényi order greatly simplifies
the analysis, and elucidates the logic behind the example.
Consider the following two experiments P and Q, parametrized by β and α, respectively.
In each matrix, entries are conditional probabilities of observing each signal realization
given the state θ:
P :
θ x1 x2 x3
0 β 12
1
2 − β
1 12 − β 12 β
Q :
θ y1 y2
0 α 1− α
1 1− α α
The parameters satisfy 0 ≤ β ≤ 1/4 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2. The experiment Q is a
symmetric, binary experiment. The experiment P with probability 1/2 yields a completely
uninformative signal realization x2, and with probability 1/2 yields an observation from
another symmetric binary experiment. As shown by Azrieli (2014, Claim 1), the experiments
P and Q are not ranked in the Blackwell order for parameter values 2β < α < 1/4 + β.
Azrieli (2014) points out that a necessary condition for P to dominate Q in large
8
samples is that the Rényi divergences are ranked at 1/2, that is R1P (1/2) > R1Q(1/2).5
In addition, he conjectures it is also a sufficient condition, and proves it in the special
case of β = 0. We show that for the experiments in the example, the fact that the Rényi
divergences are ranked at 1/2 is enough to imply dominance in the Rényi order, and
therefore, by Theorem 1, dominance in large samples. This settles the above conjecture in
the affirmative.6
Proposition 2. Suppose R1P (1/2) > R1Q(1/2). Then R1P (t) > R1Q(t) for all t > 0 and by
symmetry R0P (t) > R0Q(t), hence P dominates Q in large samples.
3.2 A Quantification of Blackwell Dominance in Large Samples
The characterization in Theorem 1 makes it possible to quantify the extent to which one
experiment Blackwell dominates another in large samples. This is a natural question, given
the inherent incompleteness of the Blackwell order. Our starting point is the observation
that any two experiments, even if not ranked according to dominance in large samples,
can be compared by applying different samples sizes. For example, suppose P and Q
are not comparable, but P⊗50 Blackwell dominates Q⊗100. Then 50 samples from P are
more informative than 100 from Q, and thus, in an intuitive sense, P is at least twice as
informative as Q, for large enough samples.
Our formal definition is based on the observation that for any two bounded non-trivial
experiments P and Q, there exist positive integers n,m such that P⊗n Blackwell dominates
Q⊗m.7 Thus, reasoning as above, P will be at least m/n times as informative as Q. In
large samples, we can consider the largest ratio m/n for which the above holds. This leads
to a well defined measure of dominance, which we refer to as the dominance ratio P/Q of
P with respect to Q:
P/Q = sup
{
m
n
: P⊗n  Q⊗m
}
.
Thus, in large samples, each observation from P contributes at least as much as P/Q obser-
vations from Q. An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is the following characterization
of P/Q in terms of the Rényi divergences of the two experiments.
5As in his paper, this condition can be written in terms of the parameter values as√
α(1− α) >
√
β(12 − β) +
1
4 .
Thus, when α = 0.1 and β = 0 for example, the experiment P does not Blackwell dominate Q but does
dominate it in large samples, as shown by Azrieli (2014).
6We mention that the case of α = 0.305, β = 0.1 provides an example where P⊗2 Blackwell dominates
Q⊗2, but P⊗3 does not dominate Q⊗3. Nonetheless, for generic pairs of experiments P and Q, dominance
for some sample size n implies dominance for all large sample sizes. This is a consequence of Theorem 1.
7This fact admits a simple proof, and is implied by Proposition 3.
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Proposition 3. Let P and Q be non-trivial, bounded experiments. Then
P/Q = inf
θ∈{0,1}
t>0
RθP (t)
RθQ(t)
.
Furthermore, P/Q is always positive.
This characterization, together with Theorem 1, implies that a natural alternative
definition of P/Q is equivalent to the one above:
P/Q = sup
{
a > 0 : P⊗n  Q⊗dane for all n large enough
}
where dane denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to an. Hence, P/Q identifies
an asymptotic rate of informativeness between the two experiments. We remark that the
dominance ratio P/Q is in general (in fact, generically) not equal to (Q/P )−1. However,
the inequality
(P/Q) · (Q/R) ≤ P/R
holds for every non-trivial bounded experiments P , Q and R. In particular, P/Q ≤
(Q/P )−1, where the latter can be interpreted as an asymptotic upper bound on the
information produced by one observation from P relative to Q.
4 Overview of the Proof and Methods
In this section we illustrate the main ideas and insights behind the proof of Theorem 1.
In §4.2 we point out a novel characterization of Blackwell dominance that reduces the
comparison of experiments to the comparison in terms of first-order stochastic dominance
of an appropriate statistic of the experiments. In §4.3 we use this observation to apply
uniform large-deviation techniques. Omitted proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
4.1 Repeated Experiments and Log-Likelihood Ratios
The distribution over posteriors induced by a product experiment P⊗n can be difficult to
analyze directly. A more suitable approach consists in studying the distribution of the
induced log-likelihood ratio
log dPθdP1−θ
. (4)
As is well known, given a repeated experiment P⊗n = (Ωn, Pn0 , Pn1 ), its log-likelihood ratio
satisfies, for every realization ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) in Ωn,
log dP
n
1
dPn0
(ω) =
n∑
i=1
log dP1dP0
(ωi)
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and moreover the random variables
Xi(ω) = log
dP1
dP0
(ωi) i = 1, . . . , n
are i.i.d. under Pnθ , for θ ∈ {0, 1}. Focusing on the distributions of log-likelihood ratios
will allow us to transform the study of repeated experiments to the study of sums of i.i.d.
random variables.
4.2 From Blackwell Dominance to First-Order Stochastic Dominance
Our first result is a novel characterization of the Blackwell order expressed in terms of
the distributions of the log-likelihood ratios (4). Given two experiments P = (Ω, P0, P1)
and Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1) we denote by Fθ and Gθ, respectively, the cumulative distribution
function of the log-likelihood ratios conditional on state θ. That is,
Fθ(a) = Pθ
({
log dPθdP1−θ
≤ a
})
a ∈ R, θ ∈ {0, 1} (5)
and Gθ, θ ∈ {0, 1}, are defined analogously using Qθ.
We associate to P a new quantity, which we call the perfected log-likelihood ratio of the
experiment. Define
L˜ = log dP1dP0
− E
where E is a random variable that, under P1, is independent from log(dP1/dP0) and
distributed according to an exponential distribution with support R+ and cumulative
distribution function H(x) = 1 − e−x for all x ≥ 0. We denote by F˜ the cumulative
distribution function of L˜ under P1. That is, F˜ (a) = P1({L˜ ≤ a}) for all a ∈ R.
More explicitly, F˜ is the convolution of the distribution F1 with the distribution of −E,
and thus can be defined as
F˜ (a) =
∫
R
(1−H(u− a))dF1(u) = F1(a) + ea
∫
(a,∞)
e−udF1(u). (6)
The next result shows that the Blackwell order over experiments can be reduced to
first-order stochastic dominance of the corresponding perfected log-likelihood ratios.
Theorem 2. Let P and Q be two experiments, and let F˜ and G˜, respectively, be the
associated distributions of perfected log-likelihood ratios. Then
P  Q if and only if F˜ (a) ≤ G˜(a) for all a ∈ R.
Proof. Let pi and τ be the distributions over posterior beliefs induced by P and Q,
respectively. As is well known, Blackwell dominance is equivalent to the requirement that
pi is a mean-preserving spread of τ . Equivalently, the functions defined as
Λpi(p) =
∫ p
0
(p− q)dpi(q) and Λτ (p) =
∫ p
0
(p− q)dτ(q) (7)
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must satisfy Λpi(p) ≥ Λτ (p) for every p ∈ (0, 1).
We now express (7) in terms of the distributions of log-likelihood ratios Fθ and Gθ. We
have
Λpi(p) = p
(
1
2 −
∫
(p,1]
1 dpi
)
−
∫ p
0
q dpi(q). (8)
Using the fact that q dpi(q) = 12 dpi1(q) (see (29) for a proof of this fact) we obtain
2Λpi(p) = p
(
1−
∫
(p,1]
1
q
dpi1(q)
)
−
∫ p
0
dpi1(q).
A change of variable from posterior beliefs to log-likelihood ratios, letting a = log p1−p ,
implies
2Λpi(p) =
ea
1 + ea
(
1−
∫
(a,∞)
1 + eu
eu dF1(u)
)
− F1(a). (9)
Since ∫
(a,∞)
1 + eu
eu dF1(u) =
∫
(a,∞)
e−u dF1(u) + 1− F1(a),
(9) leads to
2(1 + ea)Λpi(p) = −F1(a)− ea
∫
(a,∞)
e−u dF1(u) = −F˜ (a),
where the final equality follows from (6). It then follows that P dominates Q if and only if
F˜ (a) ≤ G˜(a) for all a ∈ R, as desired.
Intuitively, transferring probability mass from lower to higher values of log(dPθ/dP1−θ)
leads to an experiment that, conditional on the state being θ, is more likely to shift
the decision maker’s beliefs towards the correct state. Hence, one might conjecture that
Blackwell dominance of the experiments P and Q is related to stochastic dominance of
the distributions Fθ and Gθ. However, since the likelihood-ratio dP1/dP0 must satisfy the
change of measure identity
∫ dP0
dP1 dP1 = 1, the distribution F1 must satisfy∫
R
e−u dF1(u) = 1.
Because the function e−u is strictly decreasing and convex, and the same identity must
hold for G1, it is impossible for F1 to stochastically dominate G1. Theorem 2 shows that a
more useful comparison is between the perfected log-likelihood ratios.8
The next lemma simplifies the study of the perfected log-likelihood ratios, by showing
that their first-order stochastic dominance can be deduced from comparisons of the original
distributions Fθ and Gθ over subintervals.
8It might appear puzzling that two distributions F1 and G1 that are not ranked by stochastic dominance
become ranked after the addition of the same independent random variable. In a different context and
under different assumptions, the same phenomenon is studied by Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz (2019).
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Lemma 1. Consider two experiments P and Q. Let Fθ and Gθ, respectively, be the
distributions of the corresponding log-likelihood ratios, and F˜ and G˜ be the distributions of
the perfected log-likelihood ratios. For b ∈ R, the following hold:
(i). If F1(a) ≤ G1(a) for all a ≥ b, then F˜ (a) ≤ G˜(a) for all a ≥ b.
(ii). If F0(a) ≤ G0(a) for all a ≥ b, then F˜ (−a) ≤ G˜(−a) for all a ≥ b.
4.3 Large Deviations and the Rényi Order
We now illustrate how dominance in the Rényi order translates into properties of the
log-likelihood ratios, and provide a sketch of the proof of Theorem 1. In what follows,
given a bounded random variable X we denote by max[X] = min{a : P [X ≤ a] = 1} the
essential maximum of X; this is the maximum of the support of its distribution. We denote
by MX(t) = E
[
etX
]
its moment generating function.
This proof will use as a crucial ingredient the following uniform large deviation result.
A similar statement is proved in Aubrun and Nechita (2008, Lemma 2); we provide an
independent proof in the appendix, which additionally provides explicit estimates for the
threshold N described below.
Proposition 4. Let X and Y be bounded random variables that satisfy
(i). max[X] 6= max[Y ],
(ii). E [X] > E [Y ],
(iii). and MX(t) > MY (t) for all t > 0.
Then there exists N such that for all n ≥ N and a ≥ E [Y ],
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]. (10)
The result is based on the following intuition. The fact that E [X] > E [Y ] guarantees
that the dominance condition
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]. (11)
holds with respect to all values of a that lie between E [X] and E [Y ]. This is established
by applying the Berry-Esseen Theorem, a uniform version of the Central Limit Theorem.
The main step in the proof Proposition 4 uses large-deviations techniques to obtain
lower and upper bounds on the probabilities of the events {X1 + · · · + Xn ≥ na} and
{Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na} for the remaining values of a.
Large deviation theory studies low probability events, and in particular the odds with
which an i.i.d. sum deviates from its expectation. The Law of Large Numbers implies that
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the probability of the event {X1 + · · · + Xn ≥ na} is low for a > E [X] and large n. A
crucial insight due to Cramér (1938) is that the order of magnitude of the probability of
this event is determined by the behavior of the moment generating function MX(t).
The key difficulty is in obtaining bounds that allow, for a fixed n, a comparison between
the two probabilities in (11) over a whole interval of values for a. This requires a careful
application of uniform large deviation theorems due to Bahadur and Rao (1960) and Petrov
(1965).
Proposition 4 has the following implications for the study of experiments. Consider
two bounded, generic experiments P = (Ω, P0, P1) and Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1), with the property
that P dominates Q in the Rényi order, and let
X = log dP1dP0
and Y = log dQ1dQ0
be the corresponding log-likelihood ratios. We are interested in their properties conditional
on θ = 1, and so treat X as a random variable defined on the probability space (Ω, P1),
and Y as defined on (Ξ, Q1), so that their distributions are F1 and G1, respectively.
The variables X and Y satisfy all the conditions of Proposition 4. Indeed, it follows
immediately from its definition that the Rényi divergence is formally related to the moment
generating functions of the log-likelihood ratios. For any t > 0,
R1P (t) =
1
t− 1 logMX(t− 1) and R
1
Q(t) =
1
t− 1 logMY (t− 1). (12)
In addition, R1P (0) = E [X] and R1Q(0) = E [Y ]. Finally, since the two experiments are
generic, the maxima of X and Y are different.
Hence, letting (Xi) and (Yi) be i.i.d. copies of X and Y , Proposition 4 implies the
existence of a large enough N such that for for all n ≥ N and a ≥ E [Y ],
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]. (13)
As discussed earlier, X1 + · · ·+Xn has the same distribution as the log-likelihood ratio
log(dPn1 /dPn0 ) of the repeated experiment. It follows, therefore, that the distribution F ∗n1
of log(dPn1 /dPn0 ) and the distribution G∗n1 of log(dQn1/dQn0 ) satisfy
F ∗n1 (na) ≤ G∗n1 (na) for all a ≥ E [Y ] = D(Q1‖Q0).
In turn, Lemma 1 implies that the distributions of the perfected log-likelihood ratios of
the two repeated experiments are ranked for all values above nD(Q1‖Q0). Note that in
applying Proposition 4, we have only used the assumption that MX(t) > MY (t) for t ≥ 0,
or equivalently R1P (t) > R1Q(t) for t ≥ 1.
We show the same ranking holds for the range [−nD(Q0‖Q1), nD(Q1‖Q0)]. This
follows from the assumption that R1P (t) > R1Q(t) for t ∈ (0, 1). Finally, to compare the
perfected log-likelihood ratios at values below −nD(Q0‖Q1), we apply Proposition 4 as
above, but to the opposite pair of log-likelihood ratios log(dP0/dP1) and log(dQ0/dQ1).
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5 Stochastic Dominance in Large Numbers
In this section we study and characterize notions of stochastic dominance for sums of i.i.d.
random variables. The results are natural applications of the methods developed to study
repeated experiments. They provide robust criteria for comparing prospects in decision
problems that involve multiple independent risks, as in the case of a physician treating
multiple patients, or of an investor managing a large portfolio of assets.
The study of aggregate risks has a long history in economics. Samuelson (1963) asked
under what conditions an agent would reject a gamble, but accept n independent copies of
it. He deemed inconsistent the behavior of a decision maker who is willing to accept n
copies of a lottery but not one, and attributed this choice reversal to a naive interpretation
of the law of large numbers. The critical point in Samuelson’s argument is that the law of
large numbers does not provide information about the odds of rare but large deviations,
and it is therefore insufficient as a guide for action. The paper yielded a large literature
studying retirement decisions and insurance strategies (see, e.g., Pratt and Zeckhauser,
1987; Kimball, 1993; Gollier, 1996; Benartzi and Thaler, 1999), as well as in behavioral
economics (Rabin and Thaler, 2001), and finance (Ross, 1999).
In contrast to the existing literature, our study of repeated gambles makes no assump-
tions over the decision maker’s preferences, beyond monotonicity with respect to stochastic
dominance.
5.1 Definition
Recall that a random variable X dominates Y in kth-order stochastic dominance, denoted
by X ≥k Y , if E [φ(X)] ≥ E [φ(Y )] for every bounded and k-fold differentiable function φ
that is increasing and whose first k derivatives alternate in sign. That is, all functions φ
that satisfy (−1)nφ(n) ≤ 0 for all n ≤ k.
Definition 2. Let X and Y be random variables, and let (Xi) and (Yi) be i.i.d. copies of
X and Y , respectively. The random variable X is said to kth-order dominate Y in large
numbers if for all n large enough
X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥k Y1 + · · ·+ Yn. (14)
It is well-known that stochastic dominance in large numbers is implied by stochastic
dominance. In fact, if X ≥k Y then
∑n
i=1Xi ≥k
∑n
i=1 Yi for any number n of i.i.d. replicas
of the two random variable (see Lemma 6 in the appendix). The converse implication,
however, is not true.
As a simple example, let X be a lottery that pays 1 or 0 with probability 1/2, and
let Y be distributed uniformly over [−1/5, 4/5]. For instance, X might correspond to an
Arrow-Debreu security, while Y might correspond to an insurance contract that costs 1/5
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and offers a smoothed distribution of payoff that is uniform on the unit interval. The
cumulative distribution functions of X and Y are depicted in Figure 2, from which it is
clear that neither first-order dominates the other. In fact, the two distributions are not
ranked in terms of second-order stochastic dominance either. To see this, note that Y has
higher expected utility than X for the utility function given by u(x) = x for x ≤ 1/5 and
u(x) = 1/5 otherwise. It is also clear that Y does not dominate X, since X has higher
expectation.
-0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
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Figure 2: The CDFs of X and Y , in blue and orange, respectively.
Theorem 3 below will show that X first-order dominates Y in large numbers. In this
example, it is not difficult to verify that replicating the two gambles makes it possible to
rank them in terms of stochastic dominance: Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution
functions of the two sums X1 + · · · + Xn and Y1 + · · · + Yn when setting n = 35, from
which it is apparent that the first sum dominates the second one in terms of first-order
stochastic dominance.
5.2 Characterizations
In this section we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic dominance in
large numbers. To each bounded random variable X we associate the function LX : R→ R
5 10 15 20 25 30
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1.0
Figure 3: The CDFs of X1 + · · ·+Xn and Y1 + · · ·+ Yn, for n = 35, in blue and orange,
respectively.
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defined as
LX(t) =
1
t
logE
[
etX
]
(15)
for all t 6= 0, and, to guarantee continuity,
LX(0) = E [X]. (16)
If X is a gamble, then LX(t) is the certainty equivalent that a decision maker ascribes
to X, under expected utility and a utility function u whose coefficient of absolute risk
aversion is constant and equal to −t.9 Note that for t positive, such a decision maker is in
fact risk-loving; we include these agents for the analysis of first-order stochastic dominance.
The quantity LX is a standard tool in the theory of choice under risk, finance, probability
theory, and other fields. Because it amounts to a simple normalization of the moment
generating function of X, the certainty equivalent LX is known or can be easily computed
for most families of distributions commonly used in applications.
We similarly impose a mild genericity assumption: Say that a pair (X,Y ) is generic
if min[X] 6= min[Y ] and max[X] 6= max[Y ]. The next result characterizes first-order
dominance in large numbers:
Theorem 3. Let X and Y be a generic pair of bounded random variables. Then the
following are equivalent:
(i). LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ∈ R,
(ii). X first-order dominates Y in large numbers.
The result is an immediate corollary of Proposition 4 introduced in the proof of Theorem
1; see also Aubrun and Nechita (2008, Lemma 2). Figure 4 depicts the certainty equivalents
LX and LY for the two gambles introduced in our earlier example. As shown in the figure
and can be verified analytically, the certainty equivalent of X lies above that of Y .
We now turn our attention to preferences that display risk aversion. The next theorem
characterizes higher-order dominance in large numbers:
Theorem 4. Let X and Y be a generic pair of bounded random variables such that
E [X] 6= E [Y ]. Then the following are equivalent:
(i). LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ≤ 0.
(ii). X second-order dominates Y in large numbers.
(iii). X kth-order dominates Y in large numbers, for some k ≥ 2.
9Up to an affine transformation, u is of the form u(x) = etx for t positive, u(x) = −etx for t negative,
and u(x) = x for t = 0.
17
-20 -10 10 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 4: LX and LY in the example of §5.1, in blue and orange, respectively.
(iv). X ≥k Y , for some k ≥ 2.
Theorem 4 establishes a sharp equivalence between stochastic dominance in large
numbers and an elementary and well-known class of preferences. The correspondence
between (i) and (ii) shows that whenever all risk-averse CARA agents unanimously prefer
X over Y , then, for a large enough number of repetitions, all agents with monotone
risk-averse preferences will agree on this ranking. Moreover, this condition is both sufficient
and necessary.
The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) shows that there is no difference between second and
higher order risk attitudes when it comes to large numbers: For every k ≥ 2, X kth-order
dominates Y in large numbers if and only if it second-order dominates it in large numbers.
This fact might appear surprising. Higher-order risk attitudes describe increasingly nuanced
properties of a decision maker’s preferences. Prudence (Kimball, 1990), i.e. the requirement
that the third derivative of the decision maker’s utility function is positive, and temperance
(Kimball, 1991), i.e. the requirement that its fourth derivative is negative, are known to
have strong implications for comparative statics in precautionary saving problems and
decisions under background risk (Gollier, 2004). Theorem 4 shows that when considering a
sum of a sufficiently large number of i.i.d. gambles, the distinction between risk aversion
and higher-order risk attitudes collapses.
Finally, the equivalence between (iv) and (ii) establishes a novel characterization of
higher-order risk dominance based on the study of compound gambles: for every k ≥ 2, k-th
order stochastic dominance implies second-order stochastic dominance in large numbers,
which in turn implies k-th order stochastic dominance for some k.
Next, we recall that Y is amean-preserving spread ofX if both have the same expectation
and X second-order stochastically dominates Y . We define the notion of a mean-preserving
spread in large numbers analogously to Definition 2, so that for equal mean random
variables it coincides with second-order stochastic dominance in large numbers.
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Theorem 5. Let X and Y be a generic pair of bounded random variables such that
E [X] = E [Y ]. Then the following are equivalent:
(i). Var(X) < Var(Y ), LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0, and LX(t) < LY (t) for all t > 0.
(ii). Y is a mean-preserving spread of X in large numbers.
Hence, when X and Y have the same expected value, X second-order dominates Y in
large numbers if and only if X has lower variance and is preferred to Y by any risk-averse
CARA agent, while Y is preferred to X by all CARA agents who are risk-loving.
One may wonder about the difference between condition (i) here and condition (i) in
Theorem 3. Note that first-order dominance in large numbers is equivalent to LX(t) being
larger than LY (t) for all t, whereas Theorem 5 requires LX(t) to be smaller for t > 0.
There is however no inconsistency, because the assumption E [X] = E [Y ] in Theorem 5
already rules out the possibility that X1 + · · ·+Xn can first-order dominate Y1 + · · ·+ Yn.
Furthermore, in order for Y1 + · · ·+ Yn to be a mean-preserving spread of X1 + · · ·+Xn.
This suggests that the right-tail of Y1 + · · ·+ Yn should be more spread-out, as captured
by LY (t) > LX(t) for t > 0, unlike in the case of first-order stochastic dominance.
We conclude by observing that stochastic dominance in large numbers can be naturally
extended to compare compound i.i.d. returns. Two random returns X and Y can be ranked
by requiring that for every n large enough their compounded i.i.d. returns satisfy
X1 × · · · ×Xn ≥k Y1 × · · · × Yn. (17)
The resulting stochastic order amounts to stochastic dominance in large numbers applied
to log(X) and log(Y ), and is characterized in terms of the certainty equivalents induced
by all preferences that display constant relative risk aversion.
6 Discussion and Related Literature
Comparison of Experiments. Blackwell (1951, p. 101) posed the question of whether
dominance of two experiments is equivalent to dominance of their n-fold repetitions. In
the statistics literature, Torgersen (1970) provides an early example of two experiments
that are not comparable in the Blackwell order, but are comparable in large samples.
Moscarini and Smith (2002) produce an alternative criterion for comparing repeated
experiments. According to their notion, an experiment P dominates an experiment Q if
for every decision problem with finitely many actions, there exists some N such that the
payoff achievable from P⊗n is higher than that from Q⊗n whenever n ≥ N . This order
is characterized by the efficiency index of an experiment, defined, in our notation, as the
minimum over t ∈ (0, 1) of the function (t− 1)R0P (t). While in Moscarini and Smith (2002)
the number n of repetitions is allowed to depend on the decision problem, dominance in
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large samples is a criterion for comparing experiments uniformly over decision problems,
and thus is conceptually closer to Blackwell dominance.10
Azrieli (2014) shows that the Moscarini-Smith order is a strict refinement of dominance
in large samples. Perhaps surprisingly, this conclusion is reversed under a modification
of their definition: When extended to consider all decision problems, including problems
with infinitely many actions, the Moscarini-Smith order over experiments coincides with
dominance in large samples.11
Our notion of dominance in large samples is prior-free. In contrast, several authors
(Kelly, 1956; Lindley, 1956; Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano, 2013) have studied a complete
ordering of experiments, indexed by the expected reduction of entropy from prior to
posterior beliefs (i.e., mutual information between states and signals). We note that unlike
Blackwell dominance, dominance in large samples does not guarantee a higher reduction of
uncertainty given any prior belief.12
Majorization and Quantum Information. Our work is related to the study of ma-
jorization in the quantum information literature. Majorization is a stochastic order
commonly defined for distributions on countable sets. For distributions with a given
support size, this order is closely related to the Blackwell order. Let P = (Ω, P0, P1) and
Q = (Ξ, Q0, Q1) be two experiments such that Ω and Ξ are finite and of the same size, and
P0 and Q0 are the uniform distributions on Ω and Ξ. Then P Blackwell dominates Q if
and only if P1 majorizes Q1 (see Torgersen, 1985, p. 264). This no longer holds when Ω
and Ξ are of different sizes.
Motivated by questions in quantum information, Jensen (2019) asks the following
question: Given two finitely supported distributions µ and ν, when does the n-fold product
µ×n = µ× · · · × µ majorize ν×n for all large n? He shows that for the case that µ and ν
have different support sizes, the answer is given by the ranking of their Rényi entropies.13
10Recent work by Hellman and Lehrer (2019) generalizes the Moscarini-Smith order to Markov (rather
than i.i.d.) sequences of experiments. An interesting question for future work is whether dominance in
large samples admits a similar generalization.
11Consider the following extension of the Moscarini-Smith order: say that P dominates Q if for every
decision problem (with possibly infinitely many actions) there exists an N such that the expected utility
achievable from P⊗n is higher than that from Q⊗n whenever n ≥ N . Each Rényi divergence RθP (t)
corresponds to the indirect utility defined by a decision problem (see the proof of Theorem 1 in the
appendix), and for such decision problems the ranking over repeated experiments is independent of the
sample size n. We deduce that P dominates Q in this order only if P dominates Q in the Rényi order. By
Theorem 1, P must then dominate Q in large samples.
12To see this, consider the example in §3.1 with parameters α = 0.1 and β = 0. Then Proposition 2
ensures that the experiment P dominates Q in large samples. However, given a uniform prior, the residual
uncertainty under P is calculated as the expected entropy of posterior beliefs, which is 12 log(2) ≈ 0.346.
The residual uncertainty under Q is −α logα− (1− α) log(1− α) ≈ 0.325, which is lower.
13As discussed above, majorization with different support sizes does not imply Blackwell dominance.
Indeed, the ranking based on Rényi entropies is distinct from our ranking based on Rényi divergences unless
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For the case of equal support size, our Theorem 1 implies a similar result, which Jensen
(2019, Remark 3.9) conjectures to be true. We prove his conjecture in the appendix.
Fritz (2018) uses an abstract algebraic approach to prove a result that is complementary
to Theorem 3. While Fritz’s theorem does not require our genericity condition, the
comparison of distributions is stated in terms of a notion of approximate stochastic
dominance. As we mentioned above, a statement similar to Theorem 3 is implied by the
proof of Lemma 2 in Aubrun and Nechita (2008), also in the context of majorization and
quantum information theory.
Both Fritz (2018) and Jensen (2019), in their respective settings, ask a question in the
spirit of our definition of the dominance ratio, and prove results that are similar to our
Proposition 3.
Stochastic Orders. Müller and Stoyan (2002) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)
are comprehensive sources on stochastic orders. The ordering generated by the functionals
of the form LX(t) for t > 0, is known in the literature as the Laplace Transform Order, and
studied in Reuter and Riedrich (1981), Fishburn (1980), Alzaid et al. (1991) and Caballé
and Pomansky (1996), among others.
Hart (2011) proposes two complete stochastic orders that refine second-order stochastic
dominance: wealth-uniform dominance and utility-uniform dominance. He further shows
that dominance in these orders is characterized by having a smaller riskiness index/measure
given in Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009), respectively. But since
these measures of risk are distinct, an open question left by Hart (2011) is whether the two
stochastic orders agree on interesting cases beyond second-order stochastic dominance. In
§M, we show that the two uniform dominance orders both refine second-order dominance
in large numbers.
Experiments for Many States. Our analysis leaves open a number of questions. The
most salient is the extension of Theorem 1, our characterization of dominance in large
samples, to experiments with more than two states. A natural conjecture is that the ranking
of the multidimensional moment generating function of the log-likelihood ratio—which
translates to Rényi divergences in the two state case—characterizes this order for any
number of states. Unfortunately, our proof technique does not straightforwardly extend
to this general case. In particular, we do not know how to extend the reduction of the
Blackwell order to first-order stochastic dominance (Theorem 2). The technical difficulty
that arises when studying the Blackwell order for more than two states is not new to the
literature. As Jewitt (2007) writes, “the problem is the need to deal with a multivariate
stochastic dominance relation for a class of functions (convex) for which the set of extremal
rays is too complex to be of service.”
the support sizes are equal. See §N in the appendix for details.
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Appendix
The structure of the appendix follows that of the paper. After reviewing large-deviations
theory and presenting uniform deviation estimates, we provide proofs for our results in the
order in which they appeared. The only exception is that the proof of Proposition 4 is
given earlier, as a building block toward both Theorems 1 and 3.
A Uniform Large Deviations
We begin by reviewing some standard concepts from large deviations theory. For every
bounded random variable X we define ρX : R→ R+ as
ρX(a) = inf
t∈R
e−atMX(t).
whereMX(t) = E
[
etX
]
is the moment generating function ofX. We note that e−atMX(t) =
MX−a(t), hence ρX(a) is the infimum of the moment generating function of X − a.
We call a random variable non-degenerate if its distribution is not a point mass. In
this case, as is well known, MX is strictly log-convex, and if min[X] < a < max[X] then
MX−a(t)→∞ as |t| → ∞. It follows that for every a in the range min[X] < a < max[X]
the minimization problem in the definition of ρX , which is equivalent to minimizing the
strictly convex function −at+ logMX(t), has a unique solution. We denote this minimizer
by
tX(a) = argmin
t∈R
e−atMX(t).
LetKX(t) = logMX(t) denote the “cumulant generating function” of X. The first-order
condition gives that tX(a) solves
K ′X(t(a)) =
M ′X(t(a))
MX(t(a))
= a.
Note that MX(0) = 1 and M ′X(0) = E [X]. So K ′X(0) = E [X]. This, together with the
convexity of KX , shows that t(a) ≥ 0 if and only if a ≥ E [X].
Finally, for every min[X] < a < max[X] we define
σX(a) =
√
M ′′X(t(a))
MX(t(a))
− a2.
Using the above formula for t(a), we also have σX(a) =
√
K
′′
X(t(a)) which is strictly
positive whenever X is non-degenerate.
We will refer to quantities above as simply ρ(·), t(·) and σ(·) whenever X is unam-
biguously explicit from the context. The following technical lemma relates these functions
for a random variable X to the corresponding functions for its negative −X; it will allow
us to focus on large deviations “on one side” (of the expected value) and quickly deduce
analogous results for the other side.
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Lemma 2. Let X be a bounded and non-degenerate random variable. Then ρ−X(a) =
ρX(−a) for every a. If in addition min[X] < a < max[X] then t−X(a) = −tX(−a) and
σ−X(a) = σX(−a).
Proof. Notice that MX(t) = M−X(−t). Hence, given a, we have that for every t,
e−atM−X(t) = ea·(−t)MX(−t). It follows from this that ρ−X(a) = ρX(−a) and t−X(a) =
−tX(−a). σ−X(a) = σX(−a) then follows from the definition.
The main technical tool of this paper is the following lemma, due, in various forms,
to (Bahadur and Rao, 1960, Lemma 2) and to (Petrov, 1965, Theorems 5 and 6). It is a
sharp, quantitative large deviations estimate, which will be useful not only for proving our
asymptotic results above, but can also be used for estimating the number n of repetitions
required to achieve stochastic dominance.
Lemma 3. Let X be a bounded and non-degenerate random variable and let b > 0 satisfy
P [|X| ≤ b/2] = 1. Let X1, X2, . . . be i.i.d. copies of X.
Then for every E [X] ≤ a < max[X] and every n, it holds that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ a · n] ≤ ρ(a)n. (18)
And for every E [X] ≤ a < max[X] and n ≥ (10b/σ(a))2 it holds that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ a · n] ≥ C(a) · ρ(a)
n
√
n
(19)
where
C(a) = e
−10t(a)b · b
σ(a) ·
Inequalities similar to (18) and (19) apply to values of a that lie below the expectation
of X. Consider the case where min[X] < a ≤ E [X]. Then, by applying the inequality (19)
to the random variable −X and using Lemma 2, we obtain that for every n ≥ (10b/σX(a))2,
ρX(a)n = ρ−X(−a)n ≥ P [−X1 − · · · −Xn ≥ −a · n] = P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≤ a · n]
≥ e
−10t−X(−a)b · b
σ−X(−a) ·
ρ−X(−a)n√
n
= e
10tX(a)b · b
σX(a)
· ρX(a)
n
√
n
.
(20)
A corollary of this lemma is a lower estimate that is uniform over a ∈ [E [X],max[X]−ε].
Corollary 1. In the setting of Lemma 3, let A = [a, a] ⊂ [E [X],max[X]) be a given
interval. Then
CA = inf
a∈A
C(a) and nA = sup
a∈A
(10b/σ(a))2
are positive and finite, and hence for every a ∈ A and every n ≥ nA
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ a · n] ≥ CA · ρ(a)
n
√
n
· (21)
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Proof. Since t(a) solves K ′X(t(a)) = a and KX is strictly convex, t(a) must be strictly
increasing in a. It is thus continuous and bounded above on the compact set A. Similarly
σ(a) is continuous and strictly positive, so it is bounded above and away from zero on A.
Thus CA > 0 and nA <∞.
The next lemma is a refined version of Lemma 3, applicable to the regime of a that
vanishes with n.
Lemma 4. In the setting of Lemma 3, for every E [X] ≤ a < max[X] and every n it holds
that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ an] ≤ 1 +
√
2pi · t(a)b√
2pi · σ(a)t(a) ·
ρ(a)n√
n
.
And for every E [X] ≤ a < max[X] and n ≥ 2[σ(a)t(a)]−2 it holds that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ an] ≥ 1− 2
√
2pi · t(a)b
2
√
2pi · σ(a)t(a) ·
ρ(a)n√
n
.
This, and the previous lemma 3, are proved in the rest of this section.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
We follow Bahadur and Rao (1960). For each a such that E [X] ≤ a < max[X], denote
pn(a) = P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ an].
Let Y a = X − a and let Fa be its cumulative distribution function. Consider, in addition,
a random variable Za whose c.d.f. is given by
G(z) = 1
ρ(a) ·
∫ z
−∞
et(a)·y dFa(y).
Note that G(∞) = 1 because by definition MY a(t(a)) = ρ(a).
More generally, the moment generating function of Za is given by
MZa(r) =
MY a(r + t(a))
ρ(a) =
MY a(r + t(a))
MY a(t(a))
It follows from M ′Y a(t(a)) = 0 that M ′Za(0) = 0, hence Za has mean 0. Moreover
σ(a)2 = M ′′Y a(t(a)) = M ′′Za(0) = Var(Za).
It is clear that Za has the same support as Y a, which, for the entire range of values of a
we consider, is contained in [−b, b]. Thus we further have
E
[
|Za|3
]
≤ b · E
[
(Za)2
]
= b · σ(a)2.
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Let Za1 , . . . , Zan be i.i.d. copies of Za, and define
Uan =
Za1 + · · ·+ Zan√
n · σ(a) .
Denote by Han(z) = P [Uan ≤ z] the c.d.f. of Uan . Then we can apply Lemma 2 in Bahadur
and Rao (1960) to obtain14
pn(a) = ρ(a)n ·
√
nσ(a)t(a) ·
∫ ∞
0
e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z · (Han(z)−Han(0)) dz.
Clearly, Han(z)−Han(0) ≤ 1 for each z. So pn(a) ≤ ρ(a)n, which yields (18), also known as
the Chernoff bound.
In the other direction, for any z0 > 0 we have
pn(a) ≥ ρ(a)n ·
√
nσ(a)t(a) ·
∫ ∞
z0
e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z · (Han(z0)−Han(0)) dz
= ρ(a)n · e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z0 · (Han(z0)−Han(0)). (22)
By the Berry-Esseen Theorem15
Han(z0)−Han(0) ≥
∫ z0
0
1√
2pi
e−x2/2 dx− E
[|Za|3]
σ(a)3
√
n
≥
∫ z0
0
1√
2pi
e−x2/2 dx− b
σ(a)
√
n
.
Note that if z0 ≤ 1 then the first term on the right hand side is at least z0/5. Hence, if we
pick z0 = 10b/(σ(a)
√
n), and let n0 = (10b/σ(a))2, then for all n ≥ n0 we have that z0 ≤ 1
and so the above yields Han(z0)−Han(0) ≥ b/(σ(a)
√
n). Hence from (22) it holds for all
n ≥ n0 that
pn(a) ≥ ρ(a)n · e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z0 · (Han(z0)−Han(0))
≥ ρ(a)n · e−10t(a)b · b
σ(a)
√
n
,
which shows (19).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
We initially proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3, arriving at
pn(a) = ρ(a)n ·
√
nσ(a)t(a) ·
∫ ∞
0
e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z · (Han(z)−Han(0)) dz.
Let Φ denote the cdf of a standard Gaussian distribution. By the Berry-Esseen Theorem
Han(z)−Han(0) ≤ Φ(z)− Φ(0) +
b
σ(a)
√
n
·
14The lemma follows from the definitions and integration by parts. We do not repeat the details.
15In fact, to obtain a simpler expression we use some recent improvements in the estimate of the constant
in the Berry-Esseen Theorem by Tyurin (2010).
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Hence
pn(a) ≤ ρ(a)n ·
√
nσ(a)t(a) ·
∫ ∞
0
e−
√
nσ(a)t(a)z ·
(
Φ(z)− Φ(0) + b
σ(a)
√
n
)
dz.
Let c =
√
nσ(a)t(a). Then integration by parts implies
c
∫ ∞
0
e−cz · (Φ(z)− Φ(0)) dz = ec2/2 · Φ(−c) (23)
Standard bounds for Φ assert that
1
c
√
2pi
(
1− 1
c2
)
≤ ec2/2 · Φ(−c) ≤ 1
c
√
2pi
. (24)
We thus obtain from the upper bound and (23) that
pn(a) ≤ ρ(a)n
(
1√
2pi
√
nσ(a)t(a)
+ b
σ(a)
√
n
)
= ρ(a)n 1√
2pi
√
nσ(a)t(a)
(
1 +
√
2pit(a)b
)
.
In the other direction, applying Berry-Esseen again, we have
Han(z)−Han(0) ≥ Φ(z)− Φ(0)−
b
σ(a)
√
n
·
For n ≥ 2[σ(a)t(a)]−2, we have c ≥ √2, and so the lower bound in (24) implies
ec2/2Φ(−c) ≥ 1
2
√
2pic
.
It follows from this estimate and (23) that
pn(a) ≥ ρ(a)n
(
1
2
√
2pi
√
nσ(a)t(a)
− b
σ(a)
√
n
)
= ρ(a)n 1
2
√
2pi
√
nσ(a)t(a)
(
1− 2√2pit(a)b
)
.
B Proof of Proposition 4
Let b be a positive number so that X and Y are supported on [−b/2, b/2]. Without loss of
generality we assume X and Y are non-degenerate.16 Moreover, since LX(t) > LY (t) for
all t ≥ 0 (as this is equivalent to conditions (ii) and (iii)), letting t→∞ yields max[X] ≥
max[Y ]. Since they are unequal by assumption, we in fact have max[X] > max[Y ].
Denote by F ∗n (respectively G∗n) the c.d.f. of the sum of n i.i.d. copies ofX (respectively
Y ). We need to show 1−F ∗n(na) ≥ 1−G∗n(na) for a ≥ E [Y ] and n large. We divide the
proof into cases.
16Otherwise, we can find non-degenerate random variables X˜ and Y˜ with distributions close to X and Y ,
such that X dominates X˜ and Y˜ dominates Y in first-order stochastic dominance, and that LX˜(t) > LY˜ (t)
still holds for every t ≥ 0. The result of Proposition 4 for the pair X˜, Y˜ implies the corresponding result for
the pair X,Y .
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Case 1: a > max[Y ]. In this case G∗n(na) = 1, and so trivially 1−F ∗n(na) ≥ 1−G∗n(na)
for any n.
Case 2: E [X] ≤ a ≤ max[Y ]. Assume, without loss of generality, that max[Y ] > E [X].
Let A = [E [X],max[Y ]] and consider CA, nA as defined in Corollary 1, applied to the
random variable X. When a ∈ A we have e−atMX(t) > e−atMY (t) for every t > 0.
Since for a > E [X] we have tX(a) > 0, this implies
ρX(a) = MX−a(tX(a)) > MY−a(tX(a)) ≥ ρY (a).
But even if a = E [X], it still holds that ρX(a) = 1 = MY−a(0) > ρY (a) since tY (a) > 0.
Thus ρX(a) > ρY (a) whenever a ∈ A.
Now, Corollary 1 implies that for all a ∈ A and n ≥ nA,
1− F ∗n(an) ≥ CA · ρX(a)
n
√
n
, (25)
while Lemma 3 implies
1−G∗n(an) ≤ ρY (a)n. (26)
As ρX and ρY are continuous functions and ρX(a) > ρY (a) on A, the ratio ρX/ρY is
bounded below by 1 + ε for some ε > 0.17
Hence, for any n such that
CA >
√
n
(1 + ε)n and n ≥ nA
it follows from (25) and (26) that 1− F ∗n(an) > 1−G∗n(an) for all a ∈ A.
Case 3: E [Y ] ≤ a ≤ E [X]. By the Berry-Esseen Theorem there exist constants kX and
kY such that for all a, ∣∣∣∣F ∗n(na)− Φ(√n · a− E [X]σX
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ kX√n (27)∣∣∣∣G∗n(na)− Φ(√n · a− E [Y ]σY
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ kY√n.
where Φ denotes the cdf of a standard Gaussian distribution, and σX , σY denote the
standard deviations of X and Y .
Fix a0 = 12(E [X] +E [Y ]). Since a0 > E [Y ] there exists an N such that n ≥ N implies
G∗n(na0) ≥ Φ
(√
n · a0 − E [Y ]
σY
)
− κY√
n
> 0.99− κY√
n
≥ 12 +
κX√
n
≥ F ∗n(n · E [X]).
17For E [X] ≤ a ≤ max[Y ], and ρY (a) = 0 if and only if a = max[Y ] and the distribution of Y has an
atom at max[Y ]. On the other hand, ρX is strictly positive on this interval.
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where the first and the last inequalities follow directly from (27). Similarly, there exists N ′
such that n ≥ N ′ implies
F ∗n(na0) ≤ Φ
(√
n · a0 − E [X]
σY
)
+ κX√
n
< 0.01 + κX√
n
≤ 12 −
κY√
n
≤ G∗n(n · E [Y ]).
Hence for n ≥ max{N,N ′}, if a0 ≤ a ≤ E [X], then
G∗n(na) ≥ G∗n(na0) > F ∗n(n · E [X]) ≥ F ∗n(na).
Conversely, if E [Y ] ≤ a ≤ a0 then
F ∗n(na) ≤ F ∗n(na0) < G∗n(n · E [Y ]) ≤ G∗n(na).
Therefore 1− F ∗n(na) > 1−G∗n(na) holds for all a in this range. Proposition 4 follows.
C Preliminaries for Comparison of Experiments
We collect here some useful facts regarding the distributions of log-likelihood ratios induced
by an experiment. Let P = (Ω, P0, P1) be an experiment and let
Π = dP1/dP01 + dP1/dP0
be the random variable corresponding to the posterior probability that θ equals 1. For
every A ⊆ [0, 1] we have
pi1(A) =
∫
Π∈A
dP1 =
∫
Π∈A
dP1
dP0
dP0 =
∫
Π∈A
Π
1−Π dP0
Thus
dpi1
dpi0
(p) = p1− p. (28)
Recall that pi = 12pi0 +
1
2pi1, so
dpi
dpi1
(p) = 12p (29)
We also observe that for every function φ that is integrable with respect to F1, defined
as in (4), ∫
R
φ(u) dF1(u) =
∫
R
φ(−v)e−v dF0(v). (30)
This implies that the moment generating function of F1
MF1(u) =
∫ ∞
−∞
etudF1(u)
satisfies
MF1(t) = MF0(−t− 1) (31)
Hence, in particular, MF1(−1) = 1.
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C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Given an exponential distribution with support R+ and cdf H(x) = 1− e−x for all x ≥ 0,
F˜ and G˜ can be written as
F˜ (a) =
∫ ∞
0
F1(a+ u)dH(u) =
∫ ∞
0
F1(a+ u)e−udu
and similarly
G˜(a) =
∫ ∞
0
G1(a+ u)e−udu.
Consider the first part of the lemma. Suppose a ≥ b, then by assumption F1(a+ u) ≤
G1(a+ u) for all u ≥ 0, which implies F˜ (a) ≤ G˜(a).
For the second part of the lemma, we will establish the following identities:
F˜ (a) =
∫ ∞
−a
F0(v)e−vdv and G˜(a) =
∫ ∞
−a
G0(v)e−vdv. (32)
Given this, the result would follow easily: If F0(a) ≤ G0(a) for all a ≥ b, then the above
implies F˜ (−a) ≤ G˜(−a) for all a ≥ b.
We now show how (32) follows from (30). We first observe that by taking φ(u) =
1(a,∞)(u) · e−u, (30) implies
F˜ (a) = F1(a) + ea
∫
(a,∞)
e−udF1(u) = F1(a) + eaF0((−a)−) (33)
where F0((−a)−) denotes the left limit of F0 evaluated at −a. Moreover, taking φ to be
the indicator function of (−∞, a] implies
F1(a) =
∫ ∞
−a
e−vdF0(v).
Integration by parts leads to
F1(a) =
∫ ∞
−a
e−vdF0(v) = −eaF0((−a)−)−
∫ ∞
−a
F0(v)e−vdv
Hence by (33), we obtain
F˜ (a) =
∫ ∞
−a
F0(v)e−vdv
as desired.
D Proof of Theorem 1
Throughout the proof, we use the notation introduced in §4.1 and §4.2 and further discussed
in §C, as well as the notation related to large deviation estimates introduced in §A.
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We first show that (i) implies (ii). As discussed in the main text, the comparison of
Rényi divergences between two experiments is independent of the number of repetitions.
Thus it suffices to show that the Rényi order refines the Blackwell order.
For t > 1, the function v1(p) = 2pt(1− p)1−t is strictly convex. Thus it is the indirect
utility function induced by some decision problem. Moreover, it is straightforward to check
that ∫ 1
0
v1(p) dpi(p) = exp((t− 1)R1P (t)),
which is a monotone transformation of the Rényi divergence. Thus, experiment P yields
higher expected payoff in this decision problem (with indirect utility v) than Q only if
R1P (t) > R1Q(t).
For t ∈ (0, 1), we consider the indirect utility function v2(p) = −2pt(1− p)1−t, which is
now convex due to the negative sign. Observe similarly that∫ 1
0
v2(p) dpi(p) = − exp((t− 1)R1P (t))
is again a monotone transformation of the Rényi divergence. So P yields higher payoff in
this decision problem only if R1P (t) > R1Q(t).
For t = 1, we consider the indirect utility function v3(p) = 2p log( p1−p), which is strictly
convex. Since ∫ 1
0
v3(p) dpi(p) = R1P (1),
P yields higher payoff only if R1P (1) > R1Q(1).
Summarizing, the above family of decision problems show that P Blackwell-dominates
Q only if R1P (t) > R1Q(t) for all t > 0. Since the two states are symmetric, we also have
R0P (t) > R0Q(t) for all t > 0. This shows P dominates Q in the Rényi order.
We now show that (ii) implies (i). The assumptions that R0P (1) > R0Q(1) and that
R1P (1) > R1Q(1) are, in terms of the notation introduced in (5), is equivalent to
E [G0] < E [F0] and E [G1] < E [F1],
where, with slight abuse of notation, given a cdf H we denote by E [H] the expectation of
a random variable with distribution H.
Let X,X1, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. and distributed according to F1 and let Y, Y1, . . . , Yn be
i.i.d. and distributed according to G1. By (12) the assumption that RθP (t) > RθQ(t) for
all positive t 6= 1 is equivalent to having MX(t) > MY (t) for t > 0 and t < −1, and
MX(t) < MY (t) for t ∈ (−1, 0). In particular, LX(t) > LY (t) for all t > −1.
By Theorem 2, it suffices to show that for n large,
X1 + · · ·+Xn − E ≥1 Y1 + · · ·+ Yn − E.
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where E is an independent, positive, exponential random variable with density e−x. That
is, we need to show for n large and all a ∈ R,
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn − E ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn − E ≥ na] (34)
We consider a number of cases.
Case 1: a ≥ E [G1]. The random variables X and Y satisfy the conditions of Proposi-
tion 4. Thus, for every n large enough and every a in this range it holds that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]
Hence F ∗n1 (na) ≤ G∗n1 (na), and so the first statement of Lemma 1 applied to F ∗n1 , G∗n1
implies
F˜ ∗n(na) ≤ G˜∗n(na),
which implies (34).
Case 2: a ≤ −E [G0]. Here we repeat the argument of the previous case, but applied to
F0 and G0, instead of F1 and G1. The hypothesis that MF1(t) < MG1(t) for all t < −1 is
equivalent, by (31), to MF0(t) > MG0(t) for all t > 0. Moreover E [F0] > E [G0], and so
the same conditions that applied in the previous case apply here. Thus there exists N such
that for n ≥ N it holds that
F ∗n0 (na) ≤ G∗n0 (na),
for every a ≥ E [G0]. Hence the second statement of Lemma 1 implies
F˜ ∗n(na) ≤ G˜∗n(na)
for all a ≤ −E [G0].
Case 3: −E [G0] ≤ a ≤ E [G1]. Here we will still show (as in case 1) that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na],
which would imply the result via Lemma 1.
Recall that tY (a) satisfies K ′Y (tY (a)) = a. Observe that K ′Y (0) = E [G1] ≥ a and
K ′Y (−1) = K ′G1(−1) = −K ′G0(0) = −E [G0] ≤ a.
Thus by convexity ofKY , we have tY (a) ∈ [−1, 0]. Since E [F1] > E [G1] and E [F0] > E [G0],
it follows that tX(a) ∈ (−1, 0).
Denote A = [−E [G0], E [G1]]. By (20), we have for all n ≥ ( 10bmina∈A σY (a))2 and a ∈ A,
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ 1− ρX(a)n
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and
P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na] ≤ 1− C(a)√
n
ρY (a)n,
where
C(a) = e
10tY (a)b · b
σY (a)
is strictly positive when a ∈ A.
We now argue that ρX(a) < ρY (a) for a in this range. Indeed, since MY (t) > MX(t)
for t ∈ (0, 1), and since (as is true for any distribution of a log-likelihood ratio) MX(0) =
MX(−1) = MY (0) = MY (−1) = 1, we have
ρY (a) = e−atY (a) ·MY (tY (a)) ≥ e−atY (a) ·MX(tY (a)) ≥ e−atX(a) ·MX(tX(a)) = ρX(a).
But the first inequality holds equal only if tY (a) ∈ {−1, 0}, in which case the second
inequality must be strict, because tX(a) = argmint e−at ·MX(t) is strictly between −1 and
0.
Therefore ρX(a) < ρY (a) for a ∈ A. By continuity,
γ := max
a∈A
ρX(a)
ρY (a)
is strictly below 1. We therefore conclude that
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]
for every n large enough to satisfy
γn <
mina∈AC(a)√
n
.
This completes the proof.
E Proof of Proposition 1
Let p1 (resp. p3) be the essential minimum (resp. maximum) of the distribution pi of
posterior beliefs induced by P . Since the support of pi has at least 3 points, we can find
p2 ∈ (p1, p3) such that pi([p1, p2]) > pi({p1}) and pi([p2, p3]) > pi({p3}).
We use this p2 to construct an experiment Q which has signal space {0, 1}, and which
is a garbling of P . Specifically, if a signal realization under P leads to posterior belief
below p2, the garbled signal is 0. If the posterior belief under P is above p2, the garbled
signal is 1. Finally, if the posterior belief is exactly p2, we let the garbled signal be 0 or 1
with equal probabilities.
Since pi([p1, p2]) > pi({p1}), the signal realization “0” under experiment Q induces a
posterior belief that is strictly bigger than p1, and smaller than p2. Likewise, the signal
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realization “1” induces a belief strictly smaller than p3, and bigger than p2. Thus P
and Q form a generic pair, and the distribution τ of posterior beliefs under Q is a strict
mean-preserving contraction of pi. We now recall that the Rényi divergences are derived
from strictly convex indirect utility functions u(p) = −pt(1 − p)1−t for 0 < t < 1 and
v(p) = pt(1− p)1−t for t > 1. Thus, RθP (t) > RθQ(t) for all θ ∈ {0, 1} and t > 0.
We will perturb Q to be a slightly more informative experiment Q′, such that P still
dominates Q′ in the Rényi order but not in the Blackwell order. For this, suppose that
under Q the posterior belief equals q1 ∈ (p1, p2) with some probability λ, and equals
q2 ∈ (p2, p3) with remaining probability. Choose any small positive number ε, and let Q′
be another binary experiment inducing the posterior belief q1 − ε(1− λ) with probability
λ, and inducing the posterior belief q2 + ελ otherwise. Such an experiment exists, because
the expected posterior belief is unchanged. By continuity, RθP (t) > RθQ′(t) still holds when
ε is sufficiently small.18 Since P and Q′ also form a generic pair, Theorem 1 shows that P
dominates Q′ in large samples.
It remains to prove that P does not dominate Q′ according to Blackwell. Consider a
decision problem where the prior is uniform, the set of actions is {0, 1}, and payoffs are
given by u(θ = a = 0) = p2, u(θ = a = 1) = 1− p2 and u(θ 6= a) = 0. The indirect utility
function is v(p) = max{(1− p)p2, p(1− p2)}, which is piece-wise linear on [0, p2] and [p2, 1]
but convex at p2. Recall that in constructing the garbling from P to Q, those posterior
beliefs under P that are below p2 are “averaged” into the single posterior belief q1 under
Q, and those above p2 are averaged into the belief q2. Thus Q achieves the same expected
utility in this decision problem as P (despite being a garbling). Nevertheless, observe that
Q′ achieves higher expected utility in this decision problem than Q.19 Hence Q′ achieves
higher expected utility than P , implying that it is not Blackwell dominated.
F Proof of Proposition 2
It is easily checked that the condition R1P (1/2) > R1Q(1/2) reduces to√
α(1− α) >
√
β(12 − β) +
1
4 . (35)
18Using the relation between R0P (t) and R1P (1 − t), it suffices to show RθP (t) > RθQ′(t) for θ ∈ {0, 1}
and t ≥ 1/2. Fixing a large T , then by uniform continuity, RθP (t) > RθQ(t) implies RθP (t) > RθQ′(t) for
t ∈ [1/2, T ] when ε is small. This also holds for t large, because as t→∞ the growth rate of the Rényi
divergences are governed by the maximum of likelihood ratios, which is larger under P than under Q′.
19Formally, since q1 − ε(1− λ) < q1 < p2 and q2 + ελ > q2 > p2, it holds that
λ · v(q1 − ε(1− λ)) + (1− λ) · v(q2 + ελ) > λ · v(q1) + (1− λ) · v(q2).
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Since the experiments form a generic pair, by Theorem 1, we just need to check dominance
in the Rényi order. Equivalently, we need to show
(12 − β)
rβ1−r + (12 − β)
1−rβr + 12 < (1− α)
rα1−r + (1− α)1−rαr, ∀0 < r < 1; (36)
(12 − β)
rβ1−r + (12 − β)
1−rβr + 12 > (1− α)
rα1−r + (1− α)1−rαr, ∀r < 0 or r > 1;
(37)
β · ln( β1
2 − β
) + (12 − β) · ln(
1
2 − β
β
) > α · ln( α1− α) + (1− α) · ln(
1− α
α
). (38)
To prove these, it suffices to consider the α that makes (35) hold with equality.20 We
will show that the above inequalities hold for this particular α, except that (36) holds
equal at r = 12 . Let us define the following function
∆(r) := (12 − β)
rβ1−r + (12 − β)
1−rβr + 12 − (1− α)
rα1−r − (1− α)1−rαr.
When (35) holds with equality, we have ∆(0) = ∆(12) = ∆(1) = 0. Thus ∆ has roots
at 0, 1 as well as a double-root at 12 . But since ∆ is a weighted sum of 4 exponential
functions plus a constant, it has at most 4 roots (counting multiplicity).21 Hence these
are the only roots, and we deduce that the function ∆ has constant sign on each of the
intervals (−∞, 0), (0, 12), (12 , 1), (1,∞).
Now observe that since 2β < α ≤ 12 , it holds that 1/2−ββ > 1−αα > 1. It is then easy
to check that ∆(r) → ∞ as r → ∞. Thus ∆(r) is strictly positive for r ∈ (1,∞). As
∆(1) = 0, its derivative is weakly positive. But recall that we have enumerated the 4 roots
of ∆. So ∆ cannot have a double-root at r = 1, and it follows that ∆′(1) is strictly positive.
Hence (38) holds.
Note that ∆′(1) > 0 and ∆(1) = 0 also implies ∆(1− ε) < 0. Thus ∆ is negative on
(12 , 1). A symmetric argument shows that ∆ is positive on (−∞, 0) and negative on (0, 12).
Hence (36) and (37) both hold, completing the proof.
G Proof of Proposition 3
Denote r = infθ,t
RθP (t)
RθQ(t)
. We would like to show that P/Q = r.
Let n,m be such that P⊗n  Q⊗m. Then, since ranking of the Rényi divergences is a
necessary condition for Blackwell dominance, and by the additivity of Rényi divergences,
n ·RθP (t) ≥ m ·RθQ(t)
for all θ ∈ {0, 1} and t > 0. Thus any such m/n is bounded above by r, and so P/Q ≤ r.
20It is clear that inequalities are easier to satisfy when α increases in the range [0, 12 ].
21This follows from Rolle’s theorem and an induction argument.
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In the other direction, take any rational number m/n < r. Then, again by the
additivity of the Rényi divergences, P⊗n dominates Q⊗m in the Rényi order. Furthermore,
the fact that limt→∞
RθP (t)
RθQ(t)
> m/n implies the pair P⊗n and Q⊗m is generic. Therefore,
by Theorem 1, we have that for some k large enough,
P⊗nk  Q⊗mk.
Thus P/Q ≥ mk/nk = m/n. Since this holds for every rational m/n that is less than r,
we can conclude that P/Q ≥ r.
Finally, note that each of the functions RθP and RθQ are positive, increasing and bounded
on (0,∞). Furthermore, using
RθP (t)
RθQ(t)
= R
1−θ
P (1− t)
R1−θQ (1− t)
,
for t ∈ (0, 1), we can rewrite
P/Q = inf
θ∈{0,1},
t>0
RθP (t)
RθQ(t)
= inf
θ∈{0,1},
t≥ 12
RθP (t)
RθQ(t)
.
Since RθP (1/2), RθQ(1/2) > 0, it follows by a compactness argument that P/Q is always
positive.
H Proof of Theorem 3
We focus on the more difficult direction, that LX(t) > LY (t) for all t (recall the definition
of LX in (15) and (16)) implies X1 + · · ·+Xn dominates Y1 + · · ·+ Yn for all large n. By
Proposition 4,
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ na]
for every a ≥ E [Y ] and n ≥ N . Moreover, LX(t) > LY (t) for t ≤ 0 implies that
L−Y (t) > L−X(t) for t ≥ 0. Thus, applying Proposition 4 to the pair −Y and −X, we
obtain
P [−Y1 − · · · − Yn ≥ na˜] ≥ P [−X1 − · · · −Xn ≥ na˜]
for every a˜ ≥ E [−X] and n ≥ N . Setting a = −a˜, this is equivalent to
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn > na] ≥ P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn > na]
for every a ≤ E [X]. Thus the inequality holds for all a when n is sufficiently large, and
Theorem 3 holds.
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I Proof of Theorem 4
(i) is equivalent to (ii). If X second-order dominates Y in large numbers, then, by
considering risk-averse CARA utility functions, we obtain that LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0;
the strict inequality is because these utility functions are strictly concave. By continuity
we thus have LX(0) ≥ LY (0), which implies E [X] ≥ E [Y ]. Since by assumption they are
unequal, we in fact have E [X] > E [Y ]. Hence (ii) implies (i).
To show (i) implies (ii), suppose LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ≤ 0. As in the proof of
Theorem 3, We assume without loss of generality that X and Y are non-degenerate, and
denote by F ∗n (resp. G∗n) the c.d.f. of the sum of n i.i.d. copies of X (resp. Y ). Furthermore,
by shifting X and Y by a constant, we can assume E [X] = µ and E [Y ] = −µ for some
positive number µ.
To prove second-order stochastic dominance, we need to show that for n large enough
and for every x ∈ R it holds that∫ x
−∞
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt ≥ 0 (39)
We again consider a few cases.
Case 1: x ≤ 0. In this case Proposition 4 applied to the random variables −Y and −X
implies G∗n(x) ≥ F ∗n(x) for all x ≤ nµ. Hence (39) holds too.
Case 2: x ≥ 0. Note that, as can be shown by integration by parts,∫ ∞
−∞
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt = nE [X]− nE [Y ] = 2nµ
Hence ∫ x
−∞
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt = 2nµ−
∫ ∞
x
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt
= 2nµ−
∫ ∞
x
(1− F ∗n(t))− (1−G∗n(t)) dt
≥ 2nµ−
∫ ∞
0
1− F ∗n(t) dt (40)
Now, again using integration by parts we have that∫ ∞
0
1− F ∗n(t) dt = nµ+
∫ 0
−∞
F ∗n(t) dt
= nµ+
∫ 0
nmin[X]
F ∗n(t) dt ≤ nµ+ n · |min[X]| · F ∗n(0).
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By the Chernoff bound (i.e., (18) in Lemma 3), F ∗n(0) ≤ ρ−X(0)n. Since ρ−X(0) < 1, for
n large enough we have that the above is at most 32nµ. Applying this estimate to (40)
yields ∫ x
−∞
G∗n(t)− F ∗n(t) dt ≥ 12nµ
for all x ≥ 0, and we have ths shown that (i) is equivalent to (ii).
(ii) is equivalent to (iii). Condition (ii) trivially implies (iii). Conversely, suppose it
holds for some n and k that X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥k Y1 + · · ·+ Yn. Since the risk-averse CARA
utility function u(x) = e−tx has derivatives that alternate signs, by definition of ≥k we
know that each risk-averse CARA agent prefers X1 + · · · + Xn to Y1 + · · · + Yn. Thus
LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ≤ 0. Hence (ii) follows by Theorem 4.
(i) is equivalent to (iv). This follows by applying Theorem 4 in Fishburn (1980),
which shows that for bounded random variables X and Y with min[X] 6= min[Y ] and
E [X] 6= E [Y ], X ≥k Y for some k ≥ 2 if and only if LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0.22 Since
LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0 holds by Theorem 4.
J Proof of Theorem 5
We first show (ii) implies (i). Suppose that Y1 + · · · + Yn is a mean-preserving spread
of X1 + · · · + Xn. Then, for every strictly convex function φ : R → R (not necessarily
increasing), it holds that
E [φ(X1 + · · ·+Xn)] < E [φ(Y1 + · · ·+ Yn)].
Choosing φ(x) = x2 and using E [X1 + · · ·+Xn] = E [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn], we deduce that
Var(X1 + · · ·+Xn) < Var(Y1 + · · ·+ Yn), and so Var(X) < Var(Y ). Moreover, choosing
φ(x) = etx implies that MX(t) < MY (t) for all t 6= 0. This is equivalent to LX(t) < LY (t)
for all t > 0 and LX(t) > LY (t) for all t < 0, as we desire to show.
Below we prove that (i) implies (ii). Since LX(t) < LY (t) for all t > 0, taking t→∞
yields max[X] ≤ max[Y ] by continuity. But since X and Y are generic, we in fact have
max[X] < max[Y ]. Similarly we have min[X] > min[Y ]. We also assume without loss
of generality that E [X] = E [Y ] = 0. Thus X and Y are bounded, zero mean random
variables satisfying the following conditions:
(i). min[X] > min[Y ].
(ii). max[X] < max[Y ].
(iii). Var(X) < Var(Y )
22In the notation used there, F,G ∈ P ∗ because X and Y are bounded, the condition G <0 F is satisfied
since min[X] > min[Y ], and the condition µF >L µG is satisfied because E [X] > E [Y ].
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(iv). MX(t) < MY (t) for all t 6= 0.
As in the proof of Theorem 3, denote by F ∗n (resp. G∗n) the c.d.f. of the sum of n
i.i.d. copies of X (resp. Y ). Let b > 0 be a number such that X and Y are supported on
[−b/2, b/2].
To prove (ii) we equivalently need to show that X1 + · · ·+Xn second-order stochastically
dominates Y1 + · · ·+ Yn for large n, since SOSD reduces to mean-preserving contraction
for random variables with the same expectation. Thus, we need to show that for n large
enough and for every x ∈ R it holds that
W (x) :=
∫ x
−∞
G∗n(y)− F ∗n(y) dy ≥ 0. (41)
Since E [X] = E [Y ], integration by parts shows that W (x) = 0 for x sufficiently large.
Thus we also have W (x) =
∫∞
x F
∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dy. The above inequality reduces to∫ ∞
x
F ∗n(t)−G∗n(t) dt ≥ 0. (42)
We will show that (42) holds for all x ≥ 0. The case of x ≤ 0 follows by applying the same
argument to −X and −Y , which also satisfy the above four conditions.
As before, we write x = na and consider a few cases.
Case 1: max[X] < a. In this range F ∗n = 1, and hence F ∗n ≥ G∗n point-wise.
Case 2: ε ≤ a ≤ max[X], with ε > 0 chosen in case 3 below. Note that LY (t) > LX(t)
for all t > 0, so the random variables Y and X almost satisfy the assumptions of Proposition
4, except that LY (0) = LX(0) (which equals their common expected value). However,
since we have a ≥ ε, we can follow the analysis in the proof of Proposition 4 and deduce
that ρY (a) > ρX(a) in this range. The result of Proposition 4 thus gives
1−G∗n(na) ≥ 1− F ∗n(na)
for all n large enough (depending on ε) and a ≥ ε. The integral in (42) is thus positive in
this range.
Case 3:
√
1
2 Var(X)
logn
n ≤ a ≤ ε. Define rX(a) = log ρX(a) (and rY analogously). It
follows from Lemma 4 that
1− F ∗n(na) ≤ exp (n · rX(a)) · 1 +
√
2pitX(a)b√
2piσX(a)tX(a)
√
n
,
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and that
1−G∗n(na) ≥ exp (n · rY (a)) 1− 2
√
2pitY (a)b
2
√
2piσY (a)tY (a)
√
n
,
provided that
n ≥ [σY (a)tY (a)]−2.
By Lemma 5 below r′X(0) = −tX(0) = 0 and
r′′X(0) = −t′X(0) = −
1
K ′′X(0)
= − 1Var(X) .
Hence by Taylor expansion, we can write
rX(a) = rX(0) + r′X(0) +
1
2r
′′
X(0)a2 +O(a3) = −
1 +O(ε)
2 Var(X)
for 0 ≤ a ≤ ε; similarly for rY (a).
Note that tX(0) = 0, so tX(a) = O(ε). Also, σX(0) = Std(X) (the standard deviation
of X), which implies σX(a) = (1 + O(ε)) Std(X). Moreover, t′X(0) = 1Var(X) > t
′
Y (0), so
tX(a) > tY (a) for 0 ≤ a ≤ ε whenever ε is sufficiently small. Plugging all of these estimates
into the above inequality for F ∗n, we have
1− F ∗n(na) ≤ exp
(
−D(ε)a
2n
2 Var(X)
)
1
2
√
2piVar(X)n · tY (a)D(ε)
, (43)
where D(ε) < 1 is a shorthand for 1−O(ε), which approaches 1 as ε→ 0.
Similarly,
1−G∗n(na) ≥ exp
(
− a
2n
2D(ε) Var(Y )
)
D(ε)
2
√
2piVar(Y )n · tY (a)
, (44)
provided that
n ≥ [σY (a)tY (a)]−2. (45)
Considering the ratio between (43) and (44), we obtain
1−G∗n(na)
1− F ∗n(na) ≥ exp
(1
2
(
D(ε)
Var(X) −
1
D(ε) Var(Y )
)
a2n
) Std(X)
2 Std(Y ) .
Denote
VXY =
1
4
( 1
Var(X) −
1
Var(Y )
)
, (46)
which is positive since Var(X) < Var(Y ). We now choose ε small enough so that
1
2
(
D(ε)
Var(X) −
1
D(ε) Var(Y )
)
> VXY > 0.
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For this ε, it thus holds that
1−G∗n(na)
1− F ∗n(na) ≥ exp
(
VXY a
2n
) Std(X)
2 Std(Y ) .
Since we are considering the case that a2 ≥ 12 Var(X) lognn we have that
1−G∗n(na)
1− F ∗n(na) ≥ exp
(1
2VXY Var(X) logn
) Std(X)
2 Std(Y ) .
This is larger than one for n large enough. So we still have F ∗n(na) ≥ G∗n(na) point-wise.
Lastly, we need to verify the condition (45). As we noted above, σY (0) = Std(Y ),
tY (0) = 0 and t′Y (0) = 1/Var(Y ). So for ε small enough and all a such that 12 Var(X)
logn
n ≤
a2 ≤ ε2 we have σY (a) = (1 +O(ε)) Std(Y ) and tY (a) = (1 +O(ε))a/Var(Y ). Hence
[σY (a)tY (a)]−2 ≤ 2 Var(Y )
a2
≤ 4 Var(Y )Var(X)
n
logn,
And so condition (45) will hold for all n sufficiently large.
Case 4:
√
1
n ≤ a ≤
√
1
2 Var(X)
logn
n . By the Berry-Esseen Theorem
F ∗n(na) ≥ 1√
2pi
∫ a√n/Std(X)
−∞
e−x2/2 dx− k√
n
and
G∗n(na) ≤ 1√
2pi
∫ a√n/Std(Y )
−∞
e−x2/2 dx+ k√
n
,
where k is a constant depending only on the distribution of X and Y . Hence
F ∗n(na)−G∗n(na) ≥ 1√
2pi
∫ a√n/Std(X)
a
√
n/Std(Y )
e−x2/2 dx− 2k√
n
.
Since e−x2/2 is decreasing in this range we can lower bound the integrand by its right limit,
yielding
F ∗n(na)−G∗n(na) ≥
( 1
Std(X) −
1
Std(Y )
)
a
√
n · e−a2n/(2 Var(X)) − 2k√
n
. (47)
Applying the assumption 1n ≤ a2 ≤ 12 Var(X) lognn yields
F ∗n(na)−G∗n(na) ≥
( 1
Std(X) −
1
Std(Y )
)
n−1/4 − 2k · n−1/2, (48)
which is again positive for all n large enough.
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Case 5: 0 ≤ a ≤
√
1
n . Recall that we defined
W (x) =
∫ ∞
x
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dy.
From cases 1-4, we have shown that for y ≥ √n, F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) ≥ 0 point-wise. Moreover,
from (48) we in fact have
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) ≥ cn−1/4
for n large enough and
√
n ≤ y ≤
√
1
2 Var(X)n logn, where c is a positive constant
independent of n. Integrating this estimate over the range of y to which it applies, we
deduce
W (
√
n) ≥
∫ √ 1
2 Var(X)n logn
√
n
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dy = cn1/4.
On the other hand, for y ∈ [0,√n], it follows from (47) that
F ∗(x)−G∗n(x) ≥ − 2k√
n
.
So for any x ∈ [0,√n],
W (x) =
∫ ∞
x
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dt
=
∫ √n
x
F ∗n(y)−G∗n(y) dy +W (√n)
≥ − 2k√
n
√
n+W (
√
n)
= −2k + cn1/4
which is positive for n large enough. This completes the proof that W (x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0,
and the theorem follows.
J.1 Additional Lemma
Lemma 5. Let X be a bounded, zero mean random variable, and define rX(a) = log ρX(a).
Then r′X(0) = −tX(0) = 0 and r′′X(0) = −t′X(0) = −1/Var(X).
Proof. We suppress the subscript X in this proof. Observe that r(a) = inftK(t)− at. So
by the envelope theorem, r′(a) = −t(a). Since t(E [X]) = 0, we deduce r′(0) = −t(0) = 0.
Moreover, we have r′′(a) = −t′(a). Now recall that t(a) satisfies K ′(t(a)) = a, and so
t′(a) = 1K′′(t(a)) . But from K(t) = logE
[
etX
]
it is easy to deduce K ′′(0) = Var(X). Hence
r′′X(0) = −t′X(0) = −1/Var(X) as desired.
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K Necessity of the Genericity Assumption
Here we present examples to show that Theorem 3 and Theorem 1 do not hold without
the genericity assumption.
Gambles. The following is an example where LX(t) > LY (t) for all t ∈ R, but X does
not dominate Y in large numbers because max[X] = max[Y ]. Fix any q ∈ (0, 1), and
consider
X =

10, w.p. q
2, w.p. 1−q2
0, w.p. 1−q2
; Y =

10, w.p. q
1, w.p. 2(1−q)3
−1, w.p. 1−q3
Let Xˆ be the random variable that takes values 2 and 0 with equal probabilities; note
that Xˆ is distributed as X, conditional on X 6= 10. Similarly define Yˆ to take value 1
w.p. 2/3 and value −1 w.p. 12 . It is easy to check that Xˆ1 + Xˆ2 first-order stochastically
dominates Yˆ1 + Yˆ2. As a result, LXˆ(t) > LYˆ (t) for all t. Since
MX(t) = q · e10t + (1− q) ·MXˆ(t),
we conclude that LX(t) > LY (t) for all t.
Nonetheless, we now show that X does not dominate Y in large numbers. For each n,
consider P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ 10n− 9]. In other for this to happen, either every Xi takes
value 10, or all but one Xi equals 10 and the remaining one equals 2. Thus
P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ 10n− 9] = qn + nqn−1 · 1− q2 .
Similarly we have
P [Y1 + · · ·+ Yn ≥ 10n− 9] = qn + nqn−1 · 2(1− q)3 .
Since the latter probability is larger, X1 + · · ·+Xn does not first-order dominate Y1 + · · ·+
Yn.23
Nonexistence of a Generator. The above example shows that stochastic dominance
in large numbers does not admit a generator. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that V was
a family of functions φ : R→ R with the property that for all bounded random variables
X and Y , X first-order dominates Y in large numbers if and only if E [φ(X)] ≥ E [φ(Y )]
for all φ ∈ V .
23Related, a slightly modification of this example shows that even if X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥1 Y1 + · · ·+ Yn for
all large n, this does not imply that X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥1 X1 + · · ·+Xn−1 +Yn for all large n. Indeed, suppose
that Y = 9 (instead of 10) w.p. q in this example, then Theorem 3 applies and shows that X dominates Y
in large numbers, but P [X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥ 10n− 9] < P [X1 + · · ·+Xn−1 + Yn ≥ 10n− 9].
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Let X, Xˆ, Y and Yˆ be defined as in the previous paragraph. Since Xˆ dominates Yˆ in
large numbers, then it must hold that E
[
φ(Xˆ)
]
≥ E
[
φ(Yˆ )
]
for all φ ∈ V . Hence,
E [φ(X)] = (1− q)E
[
φ(Xˆ)
]
+ qφ(10) = (1− q)E
[
φ(Yˆ )
]
+ qφ(10) ≥ E [φ(Y )],
implying that X dominates Y , a contradiction.
Experiments. Consider the experiments P and Q described in §3.1. Fix α = 14 and
β = 116 , which satisfy (35). Then by Proposition 2, P dominates Q in large samples.
But similar to the preceding example, we will perturb these two experiments by adding
another signal realization (to each experiment) which strongly indicates the true state is 1.
The perturbed conditional probabilities are given below:
P˜ :
θ x0 x1 x2 x3
0 ε 116
1
2
7
16 − ε
1 100ε 716
1
2
1
16 − 100ε
Q˜ :
θ y0 y1 y2
0 ε 14
3
4 − ε
1 100ε 34
1
4 − 100ε
If ε is a small positive number, then by continuity P˜ still dominates Q˜ in the Rényi
order. Nonetheless, we show below that P˜⊗n does not Blackwell-dominate Q˜⊗n for any n
and ε > 0.
To do this, let p := 100n−1100n−1+1 be a threshold belief. We will show that a decision maker
whose indirect utility function is (p− p)+ strictly prefers Q˜⊗n to P˜⊗n. Indeed, it suffices to
focus on posterior beliefs p > p; that is, the likelihood-ratio should exceed 100n−1. Under
Q˜⊗n, this can only happen if every signal realization is y0, or all but one signal is y0 and
the remaining one is y1. Thus, in the range p > p, the posterior belief has the following
distribution under Q˜⊗n:
p =

100n
100n+1 w.p.
1
2(100n + 1)εn
3·100n−1
3·100n−1+1 w.p.
n
8 (3 · 100n−1 + 1)εn−1
Similarly, under P˜⊗n the relevant posterior distribution is
p =

100n
100n+1 w.p.
1
2(100n + 1)εn
7·100n−1
7·100n−1+1 w.p.
n
32(7 · 100n−1 + 1)εn−1
Recall that the indirect utility function is (p − p)+. So Q˜⊗n yields higher expected
payoff than P˜⊗n if and only if
n
8 (3·100
n−1+1)εn−1·
(
3 · 100n−1
3 · 100n−1 + 1 − p
)
>
n
32(7·100
n−1+1)εn−1·
(
7 · 100n−1
7 · 100n−1 + 1 − p
)
.
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That is,
4(3·100n−1+1)·
(
3 · 100n−1
3 · 100n−1 + 1 −
100n−1
100n−1 + 1
)
> (7·100n−1+1)·
(
7 · 100n−1
7 · 100n−1 + 1 −
100n−1
100n−1 + 1
)
.
The LHS is computed to be 8·100n−1100n−1+1 , while the RHS is
6·100n−1
100n−1+1 . Hence the above inequality
holds, and it follows that P˜⊗n does not Blackwell dominate Q˜⊗n.
L Stochastic Dominance implies Dominance in Large Numbers
Lemma 6. Suppose X ≥k Y for some k ≥ 1. Then for each n and i.i.d. replicas X1, . . . , Xn
of X and Y1, . . . , Yn of Y , it holds that
X1 + · · ·+Xn ≥k Y1 + · · ·+ Yn.
Proof. We first show that if X ≥k Y , then X + Z ≥k Y + Z whenever Z is independent
of both X and Y . Indeed, by definition we need to show E [u(X + Z)] ≥ E [u(Y + Z)] for
any u whose first k derivatives have alternating signs. The assumption that X ≥k Y shows
E [u(X + z)] ≥ E [u(Y + z)] for every realization z, since u(· + z) also has k derivatives
that alternate signs. Integrating over z then yields the claim. Repeatedly applying this
result, we obtain
X1+· · ·+Xn ≥k X1+· · ·+Xn−1+Yn ≥k X1+· · ·+Xn−2+Yn−1+Yn ≥k · · · ≥k Y1+· · ·+Yn.
This proves the lemma.
M Connection to Other Stochastic Orders
Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) propose two criteria for measuring
the riskiness of a gamble. They focus on random variables X with E [X] > 0 and
P [X < 0] > 0. The Aumann-Serrano riskiness index is the unique positive number RAS(X)
such that
E
[
e
− X
RAS(X)
]
= 1.
On the other hand, the Foster-Hart measure of riskiness is the unique positive number
RFH(X) such that
E
[
log
(
1 + X
RFH(X)
)]
= 0.
Hart (2011) recognizes that these indices induce two complete orderings over gambles
that refine second-order stochastic dominance. That is, we can define X to dominate
Y if and only if RAS(X) ≤ RAS(Y ) (or RFH(X) ≤ RFH(Y ), respectively). He provides
behavioral characterizations of these orders, which are called “uniform-wealth dominance”
and “uniform-utility dominance.”
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In what follows, we show that if LX(t) ≥ LY (t) for all t ≤ 0, then X is less risky than
Y according to both Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart. This, together with one direction
of Theorem 4, then proves that the two uniform dominance orders in Hart (2011) both
refine our second-order in large numbers dominance order.
To show RAS(X) ≤ RAS(Y ), let a denote 1RAS(X) and b denote
1
RAS(Y ) . By definition
we have MX(−a) = 1. But since LX(−a) ≥ LY (−a) by assumption, we obtain MY (−a) ≥
MX(−a) = 1. From MY (−a) ≥ 1, MY (0) = MY (−b) = 1, and the strict convexity of
MY (t), we can conclude that b ≤ a. Thus
RAS(X) = 1/a ≤ 1/b = RAS(Y ).
To show RFH(X) ≤ RFH(Y ), we similarly denote c = 1RFH(X) and d =
1
RFH(Y ) . By
definition,
E [log(1 + cX)] = 0 = E [log(1 + dY )].
Consider the utility function u(x) = log(1 + dx). Observe that for x > −1d , u(x) has
derivatives that alternate signs. By Bernstein’s theorem, u(x) can be written as a mixture
of linear functions and exponential functions {−e−tx}0≤t≤∞. Since by assumptionMX(t) ≤
MY (t) for all t ≤ 0, we deduce that E [u(X)] ≥ E [u(Y )].24 In other words,
E [log(1 + dX)] ≥ E [log(1 + dY )] = 0.
Now observe that the function g(λ) = E [log(1 + λX)] is strictly concave in λ, and g(0) =
g(c) = 0 ≤ g(d). Hence d ≤ c. It follows that
RFH(X) = 1/c ≤ 1/d = RFH(Y ).
N Proof of a Conjecture Regarding Majorization
Jensen (2019) studies the majorization order on finitely supported distributions. Given
two such distributions µ and ν, µ is said to majorize ν if for every n ≥ 1 it holds that the
sum of the largest n probabilities in µ is greater than or equal to the sum of the n largest
probabilities in ν. The Rényi entropy of a distribution µ defined on a finite set S is given
by
Hµ(α) =
1
1− α log
(∑
s∈S
µ(s)α
)
,
for α ∈ [0,∞) \ {1}. As with our definition of Rényi divergences, this definition is extended
to α = 1 by continuity to equal the Shannon entropy, and extended to α = ∞ to equal
− log maxs µ(s). Hence Hµ is defined on [0,∞].
24Note that LX(t) ≥ LY (t) for t → −∞ implies min[X] ≥ min[Y ]. Thus whenever E [log(1 + dY )] is
defined, so is E [log(1 + dX)].
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Note that Hµ(0) is the size of the support of µ. In his Proposition 3.7, Jensen shows
that if Hµ(α) < Hν(α) for all α ∈ [0,∞] then the n-fold product µ×n majorizes ν×n.
Commenting on his Proposition 3.7, Jensen writes “The author cautiously conjectures
that . . . the requirement of a sharp inequality at 0 could be replaced by a similar condition
regarding the α-Rényi entropies for negative α.”
To understand this statement in terms of the nomenclature and notation of our paper,
we identify each distribution µ whose support is a finite set S with the experiment
Pµ = (S, P1, P0), where P1 = µ and P0 is the uniform distribution on S. There is a simple
connection between the Rényi entropy of µ and the Rényi divergence of Pµ. For α ≥ 0,
Hµ(α) = log |S| −R1P (α). (49)
As Jensen suggests, Hµ(α) for negative α is also important, as it relates to R0P . For α ≤ 0,
Hµ(α) = log |S| − α1− αR
0
P (1− α), (50)
which extends to α = −∞ to equal − log mins µ(s). Moreover, note that
H ′µ(0) = −R0P (1) = log |S|+
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
logµ(s). (51)
As shown by Torgersen (1985, p. 264), when µ and ν have the same support size, then
majorization of ν by µ is equivalent to Blackwell domination of P ν by Pµ. Thus Jensen’s
Proposition 3.7, which assumes that the support sizes are different, has no implications for
Blackwell dominance. However, our result on Blackwell dominance does have implications
for majorization. In particular, the following proposition follows immediately from the
application of Theorem 1 to experiments of the form Pµ.
Proposition 5. Let µ, ν be finitely supported distributions with the same support size (i.e.,
Hµ(0) = Hν(0)), and such that Hµ(∞) 6= Hν(∞) and Hµ(−∞) 6= Hν(−∞). Then the
following are equivalent:
(i). Hµ(α) < Hν(α) for all α ∈ (0,∞], Hµ(α) > Hν(α) for all α ∈ [−∞, 0) and
H ′µ(0) < H ′ν(0).25
(ii). There exists an N such that µ×n majorizes ν×n for every n ≥ N .
Proof. For notational ease, let P denote Pµ and Q denote P ν . The assumption Hµ(α) <
Hν(α) for all α > 0 is equivalent, via (49), to R1P (t) > R1Q(t) for all t > 0, and to
R0P (t) > R0Q(t) for all t ∈ (0, 1), using R0P (t) = t1−tR1P (1− t) for 0 < t < 1.
25This last condition is necessary for majorization, but it was not recognized in the original conjecture of
Jensen (2019).
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On the other hand, Hµ(α) > Hν(α) for all α < 0 and H ′µ(0) < H ′ν(0) is equivalent, via
(50) and (51), to R0P (t) > R0Q(t) for all t ≥ 1. So (i) is equivalent to P dominating Q in
the Rényi order.
Finally, the assumptions that Hµ(∞) 6= Hν(∞) and Hµ(−∞) 6= Hν(−∞) translate
into maxs µ(s) 6= maxs ν(s) and mins µ(s) 6= mins ν(s), which are in turn equivalent to
requiring that P and Q be a generic pair. Therefore, by Theorem 1, (i) is equivalent to
P⊗n Blackwell dominates Q⊗n for every large n. It follows from Torgersen (1985) that (i)
is equivalent to (ii).
References
A. Alzaid, J. S. Kim, and F. Proschan. Laplace ordering and its applications. Journal of
Applied Probability, 28(1):116–130, 1991.
G. Aubrun and I. Nechita. Catalytic majorization and `p norms. Communications in
Mathematical Physics, 278(1):133–144, 2008.
R. J. Aumann and R. Serrano. An economic index of riskiness. Journal of Political
Economy, 116(5):810–836, 2008.
Y. Azrieli. Comment on “the law of large demand for information”. Econometrica, 82(1):
415–423, 2014.
R. R. Bahadur and R. R. Rao. On deviations of the sample mean. Ann. Math. Statist, 31
(4):1015–1027, 1960.
S. Benartzi and R. H. Thaler. Risk aversion or myopia? choices in repeated gambles and
retirement investments. Management science, 45(3):364–381, 1999.
D. Blackwell. Comparison of experiments. In Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium
on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, pages 93—102. University of California Press,
1951.
D. Blackwell. Equivalent comparisons of experiments. The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, pages 265–272, 1953.
D. A. Blackwell and M. A. Girshick. Theory of games and statistical decisions. Courier
Corporation, 1979.
H. F. Bohnenblust, L. S. Shapley, and S. Sherman. Reconnaissance in game theory. 1949.
J. Caballé and A. Pomansky. Mixed risk aversion. Journal of economic theory, 71(2):
485–513, 1996.
47
A. Cabrales, O. Gossner, and R. Serrano. Entropy and the value of information for investors.
American Economic Review, 103(1):360–377, 2013.
H. Cramér. Sur un nouveau théoreme-limite de la théorie des probabilités. Actual. Sci.
Ind., 736:5–23, 1938.
I. Csiszár. Axiomatic characterizations of information measures. Entropy, 10(3):261–273,
2008.
P. C. Fishburn. Continua of stochastic dominance relations for unbounded probability
distributions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 7(3):271–285, 1980.
D. P. Foster and S. Hart. An operational measure of riskiness. Journal of Political Economy,
117(5):785–814, 2009.
T. Fritz. Resource convertibility and ordered commutative monoids. Mathematical Struc-
tures in Computer Science, 27(6):850–938, 2017.
T. Fritz. A generalization of Strassen’s Positivstellensatz and its application to large
deviation theory. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.08667v3, 2018.
C. Gollier. Repeated optional gambles and risk aversion. Management Science, 42(11):
1524–1530, 1996.
C. Gollier. The economics of risk and time. MIT press, 2004.
S. Hart. Comparing risks by acceptance and rejection. Journal of Political Economy, 119
(4):617–638, 2011.
Z. Hellman and E. Lehrer. Valuing information by repeated markov signals. Working
Paper, 2019.
R. Horodecki, P. Horodecki, M. Horodecki, and K. Horodecki. Quantum entanglement.
Reviews of modern physics, 81(2):865, 2009.
A. K. Jensen. Asymptotic majorization of finite probability distributions. IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory, 2019.
I. Jewitt. Information order in decision and agency problems. Technical report, Nuffield
College, 2007.
J. L. Kelly. A new interpretation of information rate. IRE Transactions on Information
Theory, 2(3):185–189, 1956.
M. S. Kimball. Precautionary saving in the small and in the large. Econometrica, 58(1):
53–73, 1990.
48
M. S. Kimball. Precautionary motives for holding assets. Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1991.
M. S. Kimball. Standard risk aversion. Econometrica, 61(3):589–611, 1993.
A. Krishnamurthy, K. Kandasamy, B. Poczos, and L. Wasserman. Nonparametric estimation
of renyi divergence and friends. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages
919–927, 2014.
F. Liese and I. Vajda. On divergences and informations in statistics and information theory.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 52(10):4394–4412, 2006.
D. V. Lindley. On a measure of the information provided by an experiment. The Annals
of Mathematical Statistics, 27(4):986–1005, 1956.
G. Moscarini and L. Smith. The law of large demand for information. Econometrica, 70
(6):2351–2366, 2002.
A. Müller and D. Stoyan. Comparison methods for stochastic models and risks, volume
389. Wiley New York, 2002.
V. V. Petrov. On the probabilities of large deviations for sums of independent random
variables. Theory of Probability & Its Applications, 10(2):287–298, 1965.
B. Póczos, L. Xiong, and J. Schneider. Nonparametric divergence estimation with applica-
tions to machine learning on distributions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1202.3758, 2012.
L. Pomatto, P. Strack, and O. Tamuz. Stochastic dominance under independent noise.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.06927, 2019.
J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeckhauser. Proper risk aversion. Econometrica, pages 143–154,
1987.
M. Rabin and R. H. Thaler. Anomalies: risk aversion. Journal of Economic perspectives,
15(1):219–232, 2001.
A. Rényi. On measures of entropy and information. In Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley
Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Volume 1: Contributions to the
Theory of Statistics. The Regents of the University of California, 1961.
H. Reuter and T. Riedrich. On maximal sets of functions compatible with a partial ordering
for distribution functions. Mathematische Operationsforschung und Statistik. Series
Optimization, 12(4):597–605, 1981.
S. A. Ross. Adding risks: Samuelson’s fallacy of large numbers revisited. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 34(3):323–339, 1999.
49
P. A. Samuelson. Risk and uncertainty: A fallacy of large numbers. Scientia, 1963.
M. Shaked and J. G. Shanthikumar. Stochastic orders. Springer Science & Business Media,
2007.
L. Smith and P. Sørensen. Pathological outcomes of observational learning. Econometrica,
68(2):371–398, 2000.
E. Torgersen. Majorization and approximate majorization for families of measures, appli-
cations to local comparison of experiments and the theory of majorization of vectors in r
n (schur convexity). In Linear Statistical Inference, pages 259–310. Springer, 1985.
E. Torgersen. Comparison of statistical experiments, volume 36. Cambridge University
Press, 1991.
E. N. Torgersen. Comparison of experiments when the parameter space is finite. Probability
Theory and Related Fields, 16(3):219–249, 1970.
I. S. Tyurin. An improvement of upper estimates of the constants in the Lyapunov theorem.
Russian Mathematical Surveys, 65(3):201–202, 2010.
50
